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INFORMATION PRIVACY LITIGATION AS
BELLWETHER FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Julie E. Cohen*
ABSTRACT
Information privacy litigation is controversial and headline-grabbing.
New class complaints are filed seemingly every few weeks.  Legal schol-
ars vie with one another to articulate more comprehensive theories of
harm that such lawsuits might vindicate.  Large information businesses
and defense counsel bemoan the threats that information privacy litiga-
tion poses to corporate bottom lines and to “innovation” more gener-
ally. For all that, though, the track record of litigation achievements on
the information privacy front is stunningly poor.  This Article examines
emerging conventions for disposing of information privacy claims, in-
cluding denial of standing, enforcement of boilerplate waivers, denial of
class certification, disposal via opaque multidistrict litigation proceed-
ings, and cy pres settlements.  It argues that, in an era of complex, infor-
mationally-mediated harms, the information privacy lawsuit is a marker
of both institutional stress and institutional opportunity.  The inability
of most information privacy claims to gain meaningful traction reflects
the influence of powerful repeat players interested in minimizing their
exposure to claims of informational injury.  But it also raises important
questions about how judicial processes can be adapted to deal with the
predominantly informational and infrastructural harms that increas-
ingly characterize our networked, information-based political economy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information privacy litigation is controversial and headline-grab-
bing.  New class complaints are filed seemingly every few weeks.  Typ-
ically, such complaints assert claims under sector-specific statutes and
also assert generalized tort, contract, and unfair competition claims
aimed at filling the gaps between those statutes.  Legal scholars vie
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with one another to articulate more comprehensive theories of harm
that such lawsuits might vindicate.1  Large information businesses and
defense counsel bemoan the threats that information privacy litigation
poses to corporate bottom lines and to “innovation” more generally.2
For all that, though, the track record of litigation achievements on the
information privacy front is stunningly poor.  Some claims are dis-
missed for lack of cognizable injury and others on grounds of waiver,
while still others fail at the hurdle of class certification.  The few law-
suits that survive threshold challenges disappear into a complex proce-
dural labyrinth, often under the aegis of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation.  Occasionally a settlement emerges, but such
settlements rarely seem to translate into meaningful substantive
changes in practices of mass data harvesting and processing that have
become the commercial norm in the United States.  What (if any-
thing) does it all mean?
This Article situates the strange tale of information privacy litiga-
tion within broader shifts in the landscape of remedial litigation over
the past several decades.  Among legal scholars, there is broad con-
sensus that the judicial system has reached, and perhaps already
passed, an inflection point.  Liberalized institutional features dating
from an earlier, more reformist era—including the pleading standards
inaugurated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal class ac-
1. See generally, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131
(2011); Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805 (2010); Dani-
elle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of
the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007); Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1125 (2015); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 877 (2003); Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data
Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
2. See, e.g., Brief of the Coal. for Sensible Pub. Records Access et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 1–2, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339) (“As a
result, amici’s members—some of whom supply lending, insurance or transactional information,
or facilitate residential real estate purchases—face increased costs of doing business and are
significantly less willing to bear risk and to innovate, to the ultimate detriment of all consumers
and the economy.”); Brief for Amici Curiae Ebay, Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioner at 23–24,
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1540 (No. 13-1339) (“Perversely, the primary consequences of the expen-
sive litigation and resulting in terrorem settlements of these no-injury controversies are the diver-
sion of resources away from technology companies’ efforts to develop and provide increasingly
innovative services and products to the users who often comprise the putative classes in these
cases.”); Brief of Trans Union LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Spokeo, 136
S. Ct. at 1540 (No. 13-1339) (“If this Court does not grant the petition for certiorari and correct
the Ninth Circuit’s error, then the immediate result will be more ‘bet the company’ litigation
filed under the [Fair Credit Reporting] Act,” inevitably reducing innovation in new data services
and diminishing “the scope of predictive information available to credit grantors to manage
risk.”); see also LARRY DOWNES, CATO INST., A RATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PRIVACY “CRI-
SIS” 1–2, 16 (2013), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/rational-response-privacy-
crisis.
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tion procedures, standards of tort liability capable of reaching the
manufacture of complex consumer products, and statutory regimes in-
tended to help courts reach and remedy a variety of other, informa-
tion-based harms—are being systematically ratcheted back.3
Meanwhile, due in part to the volume of case filings and in part to the
increasing complexity of some types of litigation, the court system
now seems to function principally to funnel disputes toward settle-
ment.4  Those stories are by now familiar ones.  This Article argues
that emerging conventions for disposing of information privacy claims
are poised both to become capstone achievements of the ongoing pro-
cess of litigation retrenchment and to supply advocates of retrench-
ment with powerful new narratives for justifying judicial avoidance of
information-economy mass justice claims.  Yet information privacy lit-
igation also might become a catalyst for transformative institutional
change.
The tale unfolds in three acts.  Part II considers the contention that
privacy harms are inherently nonjusticiable and concludes that, at
least as a conceptual matter, objections to justiciability are overblown.
When the claims now being raised about harm and injury in modern
privacy litigation are viewed in light of the arcs of product liability and
intellectual property law over the last century or so, they are not as
remarkable as opponents have worked to make them seem.  What has
changed is the political will to hold private enterprise accountable for
its role in configuring the built and mass-marketed environment to
generate particular types of collateral damage.  As the judicial system
has encountered the demands of evolving political economy, it some-
times has found ways to accommodate the issues of concreteness, im-
minence, and causation that new types of claims about injury have
3. On pleading standards, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  On class actions, see, for example, Comcast Corp. v. Behr-
end, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (rejecting certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action because
plaintiffs failed to provide a sufficiently precise mechanism to calculate damages), and Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading
standard.  A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with
the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous
parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”).  On standards for tort liability, see, for example,
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 476 (Cal. 1988) (excepting prescription drugs from strict
products liability); Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts,
26 REV. LITIG. 883, 892 (2007).  On statutory regimes, see, for example, FAA v. Cooper, 566
U.S. 284, 299 (2012) (holding that actual damages under the Privacy Act of 1974 are “limited to
proven pecuniary or economic harm” and thus rejecting claim for statutory damages where
plaintiff proved only emotional damages); and Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665, 683
(Cal. 1985) (upholding statutory limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice suits).
4. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713,
1721–25 (2012); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 421–22 (1982).
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been thought to raise, and it might begin to do so again in the infor-
mation privacy context.
Part III explores the ways that procedural barriers to remedial liti-
gation, including waiver, class certification thresholds, and the filing-
to-settlement pipeline, have unfolded in the information privacy con-
text.  It argues that, in part because of widespread acquiescence in the
framing of information privacy interests predominantly as contractu-
ally-mediated, inherently individualized processes of self-manage-
ment, information privacy lawsuits present the perfect confluence of
opportunities for litigants and courts seeking to accelerate institu-
tional resistance to information-economy mass justice claims.
Finally, Part IV turns to the broader, interlinked questions of
redressability and institutional competence, considering whether other
legal institutions—for example, administrative agencies—simply are
better equipped to grapple with the systemic questions that surround
mass data harvesting and processing.  The argument from institutional
competence has the comforting ring of tradition, but ignores the fact
that our legal institutions, including both courts and administrative
agencies, are already changing as they struggle to respond to the con-
ceptual and logistical problems posed by information-economy dis-
putes.  Some questions undoubtedly will prove to be more
appropriately directed to other branches of government, but the
courts also have an important role to play in determining the shape of
legal institutions and the conditions of access to justice in the
networked information society.  For that to happen, though, they must
reconsider some of the procedural barriers they have put in place to
deflect responsibility for resolving aggregate claims in general and in-
formation privacy claims in particular.
The moral of the story is that information privacy litigation should
be controversial, but for somewhat different reasons than most people
appear to think.  In an era of complex, informationally mediated
harms, the information privacy lawsuit is a marker of both institu-
tional stress and institutional opportunity.  The inability of most infor-
mation privacy claims to gain meaningful traction reflects the
influence of powerful repeat players interested in minimizing their ex-
posure to claims of informational injury.  But it also raises important
questions about how judicial processes can be adapted to deal with the
predominantly informational and infrastructural harms that increas-
ingly characterize our networked, information-based political
economy.
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II. CONCEPTUALIZING PRIVACY INJURIES AND HARMS
An initial set of obstacles to information privacy litigation concerns
justiciability.  To establish standing to litigate in federal court, a plain-
tiff must establish injury in fact, which requires a showing of harm that
is concrete and particularized, actual or imminent rather than conjec-
tural or hypothetical, and fairly traceable to the defendant’s activity.5
The harm also must be likely to be redressed by a favorable decision,
an issue that I consider more closely in Part IV.6  Although state
courts don’t impose identical injury-in-fact requirements, would-be
privacy plaintiffs still must allege cognizable injury.  In either court
system, litigants who succeed in establishing standing must then sub-
stantiate allegations of injury by showing harm if they want to recover.
As Seth Kreimer explains, the injury-in-fact doctrine is a mid-twen-
tieth-century invention, created by the Court in response to cases in
which the claimed injuries were predominantly informational and
seemed too general and intangible to count as redressable wrongs.7
Put differently, the injury-in-fact doctrine is a generally reactionary
(i.e., noninterventionist) institutional response to the advent of the in-
formation economy.  Faced with a variety of situations involving com-
plex, informationally mediated activities and correspondingly complex
harms, courts have erected jurisdictional bulwarks against certain
kinds of claims.  Information privacy litigation offers an especially
stark example of this process of institutional retrenchment in action.
Yet the noninterventionist stance toward information-economy
problems is also nonuniform: Courts have been considerably more re-
ceptive to claims involving intellectual property and computer tres-
pass-based harms.  Both stances reflect carefully constructed
narratives about the appropriate institutional role for courts at a mo-
ment of economic transformation.
A. Concreteness and the Problem of Intangibility
The first set of standing-related objections to information privacy
claims concerns their asserted lack of concreteness and particulariza-
tion.  The information industries and their advocates argue that the
ordinary acts of information collection and use that have become rou-
tine background conditions in the information environment create no
cognizable injury, both because tiny bits of personal information have
5. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
6. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
7. Seth F. Kreimer, Spooky Action at a Distance: Intangible Injury in Fact in the Information
Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 747–50 (2016).
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no inherent value and because the asserted consequences of personal
data processing and profiling are too vague and speculative.8  This is
so, they argue, even when Congress has reached a different conclusion
and has defined certain acts by data processors as working legally dis-
tinct injuries.  Information privacy claims, they conclude, are really no
more than generalized claims about the perceived unfairness of eco-
nomic and technological processes that people have not yet learned to
accept.
Whether that assessment is right, of course, depends importantly on
baselines.  As Danielle Citron has noted, privacy claims seem espe-
cially vague by comparison to more traditional tort claims for bodily
injury.9  It’s not clear, though, that bodily injury cases should be the
touchstone when so many other kinds of tort claims are cognizable.10
Kreimer points out numerous other contexts in which intangibility is
no particular bar to standing, and Ryan Calo concludes that privacy
naysayers who ignore those and similar exceptions are indulging in a
specious privacy exceptionalism.11
I agree with all of those arguments but want to make a point that is
slightly different: Over the years we have come to think of the theo-
ries of recovery commonly employed in more traditional tort contexts
as concrete and precise, and in the process we have learned to over-
look the fact that they are neither.  Both bodily injury and the seem-
ingly more nebulous categories of “pain and suffering” and “mental
anguish” serve as proxies for other types of harms that are inherently
8. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“[A] single,
random cardholder’s name has little or no intrinsic value to defendants (or a merchant). Rather,
an individual name has value only when it is associated with one of defendants’ lists. Defendants
create value by categorizing and aggregating these names.”); Shibley v. Time Inc., 341 N.E.2d
337, 339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); Brief for Experian Info. Sols., Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 1–2, First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012) (No. 10-708) (“Such
suits are possible because the [Fair Credit Reporting] Act permits plaintiffs to sue for . . . what
may be a wholly technical violation. Indeed, it is not uncommon in these cases for significant
numbers of class members to have actually benefited from the alleged violations.”); Brief of
Trans Union LLC, supra note 2, at 19 (“It is rare for a single item, inaccurate in a small detail, to R
actually result in a denial of credit.”); James C. Cooper, Opinion: Why the Supreme Court Should
Side with Data Brokers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2015/1102/Opinion-Why-the-Supreme-Court-should-side-with-
data-brokers; Kashmir Hill, Supreme Court Disappoints Facebook, LinkedIn, Zynga and Yahoo,
FORBES (Jun. 28, 2012, 11:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/06/28/supreme-
court-disappoints-facebook-linkedin-zynga-and-yahoo/.
9. Citron, Reservoirs of Danger, supra note 1, at 289–96. R
10. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Injury
§§ 46–47 (2010) (defining causes of action for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional harm
and negligent conduct directly inflicting emotional harm).
11. Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 U. COLO. J. TELECOMM’N & TECH. L. 361
(2014); Kreimer, supra note 7, at 754–57. R
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anticipatory: lost wages, loss of consortium, lost future happiness, and
so on.  Focusing on impairment and suffering in the here and now
functions conceptually as a way of black-boxing the complex processes
by which an unknowable future is translated into a calculable pre-
sent.12  At the same time, courts have rejected numerous attempts to
formalize injury valuation more precisely—for example, by following
the British model that draws on actuarial computation—on the
ground that those more definite methods would unacceptably truncate
a process that is, and should be, more holistic.13
One certainly could do at least as well (if not better) at valuing and
compensating privacy injury.  For example, data mining offers em-
ployers tools designed to predict which prospective employees will be
difficult to retain for personal reasons and which current employees
may be looking for work elsewhere.  Armed with that information,
employers can decline to hire candidates characterized as high turno-
ver risks and can use the pool of money available for raises to retain
those employees most at risk of leaving.14  In a suit for employment
discrimination, breach of contract, or violation of other applicable la-
bor and employment laws, a court could instruct the jury to consider
what an individual’s services would be worth if the factors suggesting
turnover risk had not been considered or if raises were distributed
solely based on performance.  In other contexts, profiling and data
mining enable merchants and lenders to target particular consumer
populations and tailor pricing for goods and services to different kinds
of attributes.15  In a suit for violation of the consumer protection or
12. On the sociological processes by which forms of economic knowledge are constructed, see
generally Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda, The Epistemization of Economic Transactions, 49
CURRENT SOC. 27 (2001); Peter Miller, Governing by Numbers: Why Calculative Practices Mat-
ter, 68 SOC. RES. 379 (2001).
13. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and
Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989); Philip L. Merkel, Pain and Suffering Damages at Mid-
Twentieth Century: A Retrospective View of the Problem and the Legal Academy’s First Re-
sponses, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 545 (2006); see also Heidi Li Feldman, Loss, 35 N.M. L. REV. 375
(2005) (arguing that a holistic approach best reflects both tort traditions and classical under-
standings of human welfare).
14. See Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forth-
coming 2017).
15. See, e.g., Flexible Figures, ECONOMIST (Jan. 30, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/
business/21689541-growing-number-companies-are-using-dynamic-pricing-flexible-figures; Olga
Kharif, Supermarkets Offer Personalized Pricing, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2013, 3:37 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-14/2014-outlook-supermarkets-offer-personalized-
pricing; Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23,
2012, 6:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577488822667325882;
Greg Petro, Dynamic Pricing: Which Customers Are Worth the Most? Amazon, Delta Airlines
and Staples Weigh In, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2015, 1:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregpetro/
2015/04/17/dynamic-pricing-which-customers-are-worth-the-most-amazon-delta-airlines-and-
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fairness-in-lending laws, the jury could consider evidence about the
services offered and the prices charged to other, differently situated
groups.
Before dismissing these suggestions as far-fetched, consider that
courts attempting to quantify damages in copyright and patent in-
fringement cases engage in very similar reasoning.  They assign dam-
ages based on hypothesized reasonable licensing fees for imagined
transactions.16  They posit menus of licensing rates for nascent or non-
existent markets.17  They determine the profits attributable to infring-
ing activity by means of arithmetically convenient fictions—for
example, awarding one-seventeenth of the profits earned by an entire
album as damages for sampling a few bars of the plaintiff’s song on
one of the album’s seventeen tracks.18
Some types of asserted intellectual property harm are impossible to
quantify with any accuracy, but the copyright system has an answer for
that, too.  It provides statutory damages as an alternative measure for
the rightholder to elect.  For ordinary (i.e., nonwillful) infringement, a
court may in its discretion award up to $30,000 for “all infringements
involved in the action, with respect to any one work”; for willful in-
fringement, the upper bound increases to $150,000.19  Courts have ex-
ercised their discretion broadly, awarding damages that often seem to
be based on little more than their intuitive sense of the rightness or
wrongness of the challenged conduct.20  And the courts of appeal have
staples-weigh-in/#208e69675f04; Jennifer Valentino-Devries et al., Websites Vary Prices, Deals
Based on Users’ Information, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/article_email/
SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534-lMyQjAxMTAyMDIwMzEyNDMyWj.html.
16. See, e.g., Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, 765 F.3d 1081, 1087–93 (9th Cir. 2014); Jarvis v. K2,
Inc. 486 F.3d 526, 534–35 (9th Cir. 2007); ON Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2001);
Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 115, 127–38
(2015).
17. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 804 (6th Cir. 2005);
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386–88 (6th Cir. 1996); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929–31 (2d Cir. 1995).
18. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ’g, 507 F.3d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 2007); An-
dreas v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 336 F.3d 789, 795 (8th Cir. 2003) (awarding plaintiff 10% of
profits from sale of Audi TT coupe during the time period that infringing commercial aired);
Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 487 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming jury finding that
28% of album’s profits derived from infringing song and 66% of the profits attributable to that
song derived from the infringement); Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d
826, 828–29 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding award of 0.1% of defendants profits from sale of malt
liquor during time period that infringing commercial aired based on trial judge’s conclusion that
infringement was “minimal”).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)–(2) (2012).
20. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Rem-
edy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 442–43, 453–63 (2009) (reviewing the case
law and the incentives that the statutory structure creates for strategic lawyering to maximize
awards).
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uniformly rejected the argument that some such awards are so exces-
sive that they violate due process, reasoning that even very large
awards simply serve the deterrence function that Congress intended.21
By contrast, where information privacy statutes provide for statu-
tory damages, courts have been notably less generous.  A pair of Su-
preme Court decisions interprets the statutory damages provisions of
the federal Privacy Act as authorizing awards only to plaintiffs who
can prove actual pecuniary or economic harm.22  More recently, in a
lawsuit against data aggregator Spokeo for statutory damages under
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Court vacated and re-
manded an appellate judgment recognizing standing to sue, ruling that
although some privacy injuries may be sufficiently particularized to
meet the constitutional threshold for standing, especially when they
involve violation of statutorily-defined individual rights, such injuries
also must be sufficiently “concrete.”23  The Court acknowledged that
an injury need not be “tangible” to meet that standard but declined to
state what would suffice.  It opined, however, that “not all inaccura-
cies cause harm or present any material risk of harm.”24
Again, one certainly could derive an account of concrete informa-
tion privacy injury that meets the lenient standard set in copyright
cases awarding statutory damages to plaintiffs who cannot prove ac-
tual damages.  Just as the copyright plaintiff whose works are included
in a karaoke DVD has lost a licensing opportunity (though the defen-
dant might never have taken the license and it’s impossible to say with
any certainty how much it would have paid),25 so the FCRA plaintiff
whose profile contained errors has lost appropriate employment op-
portunities (though he may never have been offered the job and it’s
impossible to say with any certainty what he would have earned).  For
Spokeo and similar businesses in the data harvesting economy,
though, the remand presents an opportunity to argue that the Court
had something different and more definite in mind.
21. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907–08 (8th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1584 (2013); Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 509 (1st
Cir. 2011).
22. See FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 299 (2012) (rejecting claim for statutory damages under
the Privacy Act of 1974 where plaintiff whose HIV status was improperly disclosed by one
agency to another proved only emotional damages); Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618 (2004) (re-
jecting claim for statutory damages under the Privacy Act of 1974 where plaintiff whose social
security number was used to caption case documents sent to other benefit claimants did not
prove any actual damages).
23. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
24. Id. at 1550.
25. See Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 583–84 (6th Cir. 2007).
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As these examples illustrate, both concreteness and particularity are
socially constructed attributes.  Judgments about the sufficiency of a
claim reflect conclusions about both the locus of experienced harm (to
a person or to an owner of intangible intellectual property) and about
the extent of desirable accountability.  Some types of asserted harms
to copyright interests are extraordinarily abstract, yet the legal system
assigns them concrete and particular value.  We can tell both that data
processing generates consequences of some sort—if it didn’t, nobody
would spend the resources to engage in it—and that the market con-
siders collected reservoirs of personal data to be valuable.  Why, then,
must the process of getting from here to there be placed beyond the
judicial system’s reach?
B. Imminence and the Problem of Risk
A second set of standing-related objections to information privacy
claims concerns whether such claims state a plausible connection to
some actual or reasonably imminent harm.  Defendants in informa-
tion privacy cases typically argue that plaintiffs who object to the col-
lection, processing, and sale of their personal information have alleged
no more than generalized, inchoate fears about possible future events,
and courts have found those arguments persuasive.26  Such fears, they
assert, are insufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a
“case or controversy” because they relate at most to risk, and risk is
not injury.
To evaluate that argument, it is important to begin by acknowledg-
ing the extent to which the injury-in-fact doctrine is itself oriented to-
ward the future.  Although injury-in-fact is framed as a bar to
litigating prospective grievances more appropriately addressed
through the political process, the “imminence” formulation implicitly
recognizes that there may be categories of harms that are felt before
they have finished arriving.27  In so doing, it opens the door to ad-
26. See, e.g., Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp., 147 F. Supp. 3d 955, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (ac-
cepting defendants’ argument that risk of future injury resulting from hacking of insecure auto-
motive software by third parties was too speculative to confer standing); Yunker v. Pandora
Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-03113-JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (ruling
that possibility of future identity theft based on access to information collected and sold to third
parties was insufficient to create standing); Hernandez v. Path, Inc., No. 12-CV-01515 YGR,
2012 WL 5194120, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2012) (“The hypothetical threat of future harm due
to a security risk to Plaintiff’s personal information is insufficient to confer Article III
standing.”).
27. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013) (“Our cases do
not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally certain that the harms they
identify will come about. In some instances, we have found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’
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dressing at least some claims about nascent harm and at the same time
designates such claims as a focal point for judicial anxiety.
The heightened sensitivity to nascent harm that the imminence
prong of the injury-in-fact doctrine both expresses and attempts to
police is in turn the product of a more general conceptual shift toward
risk monitoring and risk management that has occurred over the
course of the modern era.  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
developments in statistical and actuarial modeling began to give gov-
ernments and businesses new tools for measuring, defining, and profit-
ing from populations.28  Those developments both expressed a newly
abstract, probabilistic sensibility toward concepts like harm and loss
and promised to offer ways of making such concepts more concrete
and tractable.  As constructs based on probability and risk crystal-
lized, they also began to reshape the law, infusing the operation of
both old and new legal institutions.  Within administrative processes,
regulatory methodologies based on formal risk modeling emerged
during the late twentieth century as a response to the advent of new
analytical techniques that revealed potential chemical harms from in-
dustrial activity to be lurking nearly everywhere.29  In the courts, risk
sensibility gave rise to new categories of damages.  We have already
seen one small example of this, in the idea of damages for “pain and
suffering,” discussed in Part II.A, above.
As Kim Lane Scheppele observed nearly two decades ago, however,
the promise of probabilistic reasoning about harm and liability has
never been fully realized within the judicial system.30  The problem of
heightened risk remains one of the flashpoints.  Efforts to infuse risk
sensibility into tort law in particular have been hotly contested.  As
awareness of nascent, systemic harms became more widespread, liti-
gants began to assert new theories of injury predicated on heightened
risk of future disease and/or earlier death.  In a number of states,
courts have now ruled that exposure to a toxic chemical with a known
and sufficiently predictable risk profile can create liability for the costs
that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or
avoid that harm.”).
28. See generally, e.g., ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark
Ritter trans., 1992); IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE (1990); RISK AND MORALITY
(Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003); Francois Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE
FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 197 (Graham Burtchaell et al. eds., 1991).
29. See William Boyd, Genealogies of Risk: Searching for Safety, 1930s-1970s, 39 ECOL. L.Q.
895, 942–45 (2012).
30. Kim Lane Scheppele, Law Without Accidents, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SOCI-
ETY 267 (Pierre Bourdieu & James S. Coleman eds., 1991) (mapping the disconnect between tort
and sociological conceptions of knowledge, foreseeability, and accident avoidance).
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of ongoing medical monitoring.31  Other courts, however, have de-
clined to follow suit, and the defense bar has assailed the development
of risk-based liability for toxic tort exposure as unprincipled and po-
tentially ruinous.32
At the same time, though, following the pattern described in Part
II.A, courts have been more receptive to risk-based reasoning about
injury to digital property interests.  In cases about unauthorized access
litigated under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, courts
have relied on the statutory definition of “loss” as including “any rea-
sonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an of-
fense [or] conducting a damage assessment” to allow recovery for the
cost of evaluating and mitigating the risks created by system intru-
sions.33  The test for injunctive relief in intellectual property cases is
predicated in part on the threat of continuing harm that cannot be
remedied adequately by a monetary award.34
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus marks
the first federal appellate endorsement of risk-based reasoning about
standing in the information privacy context.35  The plaintiffs in
Remijas alleged a variety of injuries resulting from a data breach, in-
cluding lost time and money resolving fraudulent charges and institut-
ing protective measures against identity theft and also including
heightened risk of future fraudulent charges and identity theft.  Rea-
soning that “the Neiman Marcus customers should not have to wait
31. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 835–36 (3d Cir. 1990) (permitting
recovery of medical monitoring costs upon proof of negligent exposure, proximate cause of in-
creased risk, and reasonable necessity); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795,
800–81 (Cal. 1993); Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891, 894–95 (Mass. 2009);
Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 426 (W. Va. 1999).
32. See, e.g., Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 425–26, 440–44 (1997)
(noting that “the cases authorizing recovery for medical monitoring for asymptomatic plaintiffs
in the absence of physical injury do not endorse such a full-blown, traditional tort law cause of
action” for lump-sum damages and rejecting argument for such a rule under the Federal Em-
ployers’ Liability Act); Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Mich. 2005) (holding
that “Michigan law requires an actual injury to person or property as a precondition to recovery
under a negligence theory”); George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue-Veillance: A History and Cri-
tique of the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227
(1993); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Rise of “Empty Suit” Litigation. Where
Should Tort Law Draw the Line?, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 599 (2015).  As another example, some
state courts have adopted the “lost chance of survival” theory of medical malpractice, but others
have rejected it.  For an overview, see Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 829 n.23 (Mass.
2008).
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2012); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577,
584–85 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Middleton, 231 F.2d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000) (approv-
ing jury instruction to consider “only those costs that would ‘resecure’ the computer to avoid
‘further damage’”).
34. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
35. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
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until hackers commit identity theft or credit-card fraud in order to
give the class standing, because there is an ‘objectively reasonable
likelihood’ that such an injury will occur,” the court held that both
kinds of alleged harm were cognizable.36 Remijas is widely recognized
as having opened the door to standing in the subset of information
privacy cases that involve data breaches.  Courts around the country
are now attempting to flesh out rules that more precisely distinguish
the breach-related harms that are sufficiently imminent from those
that are not.37
According to the conventional way of thinking about standing in
the information privacy context, however, other kinds of asserted in-
formation privacy harms—those predicated generally on increased
vulnerability to profiling and consequent marketplace and dignitary
injury—are too diffuse and general to count as actionable injuries.
Ryan Calo concludes, for example, that fears of heightened privacy
risk are systemic or structural in character, a classification that he de-
fends largely for reasons of taxonomic rigor.38  And, as we already
know, many hold that allegations about systemic harm are more ap-
propriately directed elsewhere—to the political process, or perhaps to
the administrative state.
I will return to the objection about the nonredressability of struc-
tural harms in Part IV; for now, I simply want to question the emerg-
ing consensus that some privacy risks are different in kind from
36. Id. at 693 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)); see also
id. at 694 (“It is telling in this connection that Neiman Marcus offered one year of credit moni-
toring and identity-theft protection to all customers for whom it had contact information and
who had shopped at their stores between January 2013 and January 2014. It is unlikely that it did
so because the risk is so ephemeral that it can safely be disregarded.”).  For a detailed explora-
tion of the ways that heightened risk and anxiety following a data breach translate into real,
concrete, and present harms, see Solove & Citron, supra note 1.
37. See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 2016) (re-
versing and remanding for further proceedings based on facts similar to those in Remijas); In re
Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 WL 3029783, at *14 (N.D. Cal.
May 27, 2016) (holding that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged loss of value of their personal
information based largely on heightened future risk); Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., No.
TDC-15-2125, 2015 WL 2946165, at *7–8 (D. Md. May 19, 2016) (distinguishing Remijas where
plaintiffs did not allege “that some of the stolen data had already been misused, that there was a
clear intent to use the plaintiffs’ personal data for fraudulent purposes, or both”); see also In re
Zappos.com, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 955 (D. Nev. 2015)
(listing pre-Remijas data breach cases declining to find standing based on increased risk).
38. Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, supra note 1, at 1135, 1139–40, 1156–61; see also R
Jane R. Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 242 (2012) (“But it is not
analytically rigorous to say that a difference in scale is a difference in kind. Without a coherent
theory of harm, accretion is merely a description of the information ecosystem we live in today
and not, necessarily, a threat.”); Adam Thierer, The Pursuit of Privacy in World Where Informa-
tion Control Is Failing, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 417–21 (2013) (arguing that many
claims of privacy harm reduce to subjective and highly variable feelings of “creepiness”).
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others.39  The purported difference between data breach cases and
cases about profiling more generally is that a data breach requires im-
mediate, discrete mitigation measures to prevent payment fraud and
identity theft.  But the sense of emergency that surrounds data
breaches has been carefully manufactured in a particular way.  Large
data breaches now receive widespread media coverage, and entire in-
dustries have sprung up to serve the needs of data breach victims, of-
fering services such as credit monitoring and credit repair.40  At the
same time, media coverage of data breaches tends to point fingers at
particular culprits—the data custodian, its purportedly ham-fisted em-
ployees, and/or the nameless hackers that perpetrated the theft—
rather than at the background condition of widespread, “ordinary”
data harvesting and processing, and there seem to be fewer concrete
measures that consumers can take to mitigate that condition.  That is
no accident; there are no vested interests in creating a comparable
sense of emergency about processes that underlie a multibillion-dollar
industry.  And yet many instances of payment fraud and identity theft
do not stem from mass data breaches.41  Rather, they are the foresee-
able results of design choices that privilege convenience and speed
over data integrity and security.
The problem, in other words, is that framing the data breach as the
exception warranting emergency response has enabled courts to ig-
nore the extent to which background norms and design practices
favoring virtually unconstrained data collection, processing, and ex-
change harm the subjects of those practices now.  Application of the
imminence prong of the injury-in-fact doctrine to preclude “ordinary”
information privacy claims frames the background sociotechnical
landscape—including all of the factors that embed vulnerability sys-
temically—as risk-neutral.  That is a mistake, and it ignores the heuris-
tics that have been applied in other contexts to translate risk-
mitigation problems into the language of injury and remedy.  In the
language of the medical monitoring cases, contemporary practices of
virtually unconstrained data collection, processing, and exchange gen-
39. The problem is not hypothetical. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016)
(remanding for determination of whether data broker’s alleged FCRA violations “entail a de-
gree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement”).
40. See, e.g., HARLAND CLARKE & JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, FEE INCOME GROWTH
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE IDENTITY PROTECTION MARKET (2011), http://harlandclarke.com/files/
user/page841/HC-Javelin-FeeIncome; see also James P. Nehf, A Legislative Framework for Re-
ducing Fraud in the Credit Repair Industry, 70 N.C. L. REV. 781, 798–803 (1992).
41. See generally Sasha Romanosky et al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity
Theft?, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 256 (2011); ERIKA HARRELL, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2014, at 2 (Sept. 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/vit14.pdf.
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erate significant risks to consumers that make ongoing monitoring
reasonably necessary.42  In the language of copyright and patent cases,
they also create a continuing threat of injury that cannot be remedied
adequately by money damages.43
C. Causation and the Problem of Proximity
A third argument sometimes levied against information privacy liti-
gants, as an objection either to standing or to liability, concerns causa-
tion.  Because webs of data collection, exchange, and processing
extend broadly throughout the economy, it can be difficult to trace the
injuries asserted by particular plaintiffs to the actions of particular de-
fendants.  This seems to stand in stark contrast to the precision of the
causal connection that exists when, for example, a defective airbag
explodes.  Defendants in information privacy litigation therefore ar-
gue that plaintiffs cannot link the asserted injuries to the actions of
any particular firm, including their own, and courts usually agree.44
42. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990); Potter v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993) (citing considerations of public
health, deterrence, and social justice); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431
(W. Va. 1999).
43. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1217
(C.D. Cal. 2007).
44. See, e.g., Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Generally, to
prove that a data breach caused identity theft, the pleadings must include allegations of a nexus
between the two instances beyond allegations of time and sequence.”); Stollenwerk v. Tri-West
Health Care Alliance, No. 05-16990, 2007 WL 4116068, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 2007) (“As a
matter of twenty-first century common knowledge, just as certain exposures can lead to certain
diseases, the theft of a computer hard drive certainly can result in an attempt by a thief to access
the contents for purposes of identity fraud, and such an attempt can succeed.”); Peters v. St.
Joseph Servs. Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 857 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (ruling that allegation that defen-
dant’s security flaws proximately caused theft of plaintiff’s identity “fails to account for the suffi-
cient break in causation caused by opportunistic third parties.”); Jianjun Fu v. Wells Fargo Home
Mortg., No. 13-cv-01271-AKK, 2014 WL 4681543, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Sep. 12, 2014) (“[B]ecause
the email at issue contained both Qin and Fu’s personal information and yet only Qin has had
her identity stolen, it is equally plausible that the thieves obtained Qin’s personal information
from sources other than the email.”); Jones v. Commerce Bank, N.A., No. 06-civ-835(HB), 2007
WL 672091, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2007) (“The thieves might well have stolen Plaintiff’s infor-
mation without any negligence on the part of Commerce. . . . In short, the facts of this case do
not establish a viable argument for res ipsa loquitur sufficient to overcome the lack of evidence
of causation on the part of Commerce.”); cf. In re Zappos.com, Inc. Customer Data Breach
Litig., No. 12-cv-00325-RJC-VPC, 2016 WL 2637810, at *5 (D. Nev. May 6, 2016) (finding allega-
tion of breach followed by injury sufficient for pleading purposes but noting that length of time
between breach and eventual injury weighs in favor of defendant). But see Remijas v. Neiman
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The fact that Target or some other store
might have caused the plaintiffs’ private information to be exposed does nothing to negate the
plaintiffs’ standing to sue. It is certainly plausible for pleading purposes that their injuries are
‘fairly traceable’ to the data breach at Neiman Marcus.”); In re Anthem Data Breach Litig., No.
15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 WL 589760, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2016) (“[U]nder Defendants’
theory, a company affected by a data breach could simply contest causation by pointing to the
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This is not, however, the first time that the court system has been
asked to recognize and then reify connections that at first appeared
either nonexistent or too imprecise.  Understanding and responding
adequately to the dilemma of probabilistic causation has been one of
the defining challenges of the modern era.  Here again, courts have
been more willing to innovate in some contexts than in others.
In the earliest days of the product liability revolution, the conven-
tional ways of framing causes of action insulated mass-market manu-
facturers from claims brought by both end-users and unlucky
bystanders.  Theories of privity foreclosed bystander claims; according
to those theories, persons lacking a prior commercial relationship with
the manufacturer could not claim that the product had performed in a
substandard fashion.45  More fundamentally, the tort system had little
experience thinking through the issues of complex harm raised by in-
dustrial processes and mass-manufactured products.  To return to the
problem of probabilistic reasoning in tort, the problem in such cases
was that the traditional tort paradigm demanded an individualized in-
quiry into cause and effect, but many industrial-era injuries were pre-
dictable only in aggregate.46  In a pair of influential opinions, then-
Judge Cardozo constructed a now-familiar doctrinal device—foresee-
ability—for bridging the gap between statistically predictable harms
and particular claimants.47  Following Cardozo’s lead, courts gradually
learned to understand industrial processes as themselves amenable to
inspection with regard to notions of fault and later also to see those
processes as appropriate sites for interventions directed toward risk-
spreading.48
Later in the twentieth century, the court system began to confront
cases in which individuation and aggregation could not be so easily
reconciled using legal fictions like foreseeability because the identity
fact that data breaches occur all the time, against various private and public entities. This would,
in turn, create a perverse incentive for companies: so long as enough data breaches take place,
individual companies will never be found liable.”).
45. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80–84 (N.J. 1960) (discussing the
privity requirement’s unsuitability to the modern economy and the growing momentum to reject
it); Vernon Palmer, Why Privity Entered Tort—An Historical Reexamination of Winterbottom v.
Wright, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 85 (1983) (discussing Winterbottom v. Wright [1842] 152 ENG.
REP. 402 (Exch.), the English contracts case that originated the privity requirement).
46. See Scheppele, supra note 30, at 269–72. R
47. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928); MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
48. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963); Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). See generally George
L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations
of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
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of the proper defendant was also unclear.  In a series of cases involv-
ing asserted manufacturing defects in generic pharmaceutical products
that could not be traced with certainty to a particular manufacturer,
courts in some states concluded that industry-wide failures could pro-
vide a basis for assigning causation based on participation in a well-
defined market and for assigning partial liability based on overall mar-
ket share.49  Not all courts, however, have proved equally willing to
assign liability in such cases.  Many refused to adopt the theory of
market share liability, citing concerns about fairness, administrability,
and institutional competence.50
As it turned out, the generic pharmaceutical cases were just a re-
hearsal for the more complex problems that began to emerge as socie-
tal understandings of harm evolved to encompass the long-term,
systemic effects of industrial development and the growing informa-
tionalization of economic activity.  Even courts that had been recep-
tive to market-share approaches balked at applying probabilistic
approaches to situations in which the contours of the market were
more complex.  So, for example, courts have resisted extending enter-
prise liability theories to toxic tort cases in which different manufac-
turers’ products contain different amounts of the substance challenged
as harmful, or in which epidemiological modeling implicates both the
challenged substance or practice and other causes.51  Commentators,
49. See, e.g., McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D. Mass. 1985); Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078
(N.Y. 1989); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342
N.W.2d 37, 48 (Wis. 1984).
50. See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 338 (Ill. 1990) (predicting that market
share cases would “bog down the judiciary in an almost futile endeavor”); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986) (reasoning that market share liability “involves social engi-
neering more appropriate within the legislative domain”); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d
241, 246 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (characterizing theory as “unfair” and “unworkable”); Gorman v.
Abbott Labs., 599 A.2d 1364 (R.I. 1991) (reasoning that “the establishment of liability requires
the identification of the specific defendant responsible for the injury”). See generally George L.
Priest, Market Share Liability in Personal Injury and Public Nuisance Litigation: An Economic
Analysis, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 109 (2010); Aaron D. Twerski, Market Share—A Tale of Two
Centuries, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 869 (1989).
51. See, e.g., White v. Celotex Corp., 907 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Unlike DES, which is
fungible, asbestos fibers are of several varieties, used in varying quantities in the various prod-
ucts that contain asbestos, and each is different in its harmful effect.”); Setliff v. E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 769–70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting toxic exposure
claim because “paint, solvents, strippers and glue products” are not fungible even if they pos-
sessed “common toxic chemical ingredients”); Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062, 1065
(Okla. 1987) (“It is of major importance that Sindell was decided in the context of a product that
was truly fungible. . . . Asbestos, on the other hand, is a name applied to a family of minerals,
each member of which carries a different degree of risk.”); Skipworth v. Lead Inds. Ass’n, Inc.,
690 A.2d 169, 172–73 (Pa. 1997) (refusing to apply market share liability to lead paint exposure
because “the relevant time period in question is far more extensive than the relevant time period
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for their part, have remained both uncertain about how tort under-
standings of cause-in-fact might better accommodate problems of
probabilistic causation and divided as to the wisdom of such accom-
modation.52  Similarly, defendants in antitrust litigation and in fraud-
on-the-market lawsuits filed under the federal securities laws have
challenged sophisticated econometric models developed to identify
and isolate price effects, arguing that price fluctuations in consumer
and securities markets reflect the influence of so many factors that it is
impossible to measure with precision the harm caused by any one
factor.53
The data processing economy is highly complex, and many of its
transactions and affiliations are cloaked in secrecy, which exacerbates
the difficulty of tracing causes and effects.54  In general, however, in-
in a DES case” and because “lead paint, as opposed to DES, is not a fungible product”). See
generally M. Stuart Madden & Jamie Holian, Defendant Indeterminacy: New Wine into Old
Skins, 67 LA. L. REV. 785 (2007); Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of
Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151 (2004).
52. The literatures here are vast.  For some noteworthy examples, see Kenneth S. Abraham,
Self-Proving Causation, 99 VA. L. REV. 1811 (2013) (arguing that in certain kinds of cases a court
may legitimately infer causation from negligence once the plaintiff has introduced sufficient
proof regarding proper definition of the reference class) (discussing Zuchowicz v. United States,
140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J.)); Danielle Conway-Jones, Factual Causation in Toxic
Tort Litigation: A Philosophical View of Proof and Certainty in Uncertain Disciplines, 35 U.
RICH. L. REV. 875 (2002) (arguing that causation standards in toxic tort cases should be in-
formed by explicit social justice considerations); Steve C. Gold, When Certainty Dissolves into
Probability: A Legal Vision of Toxic Causation for the Post-Genomic Era, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 237 (2013) (proposing a “probabilistic causal contribution model” for cause-in-fact); Jane
Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 941 (2001) (mentioning “probabilities” only once (and in a footnote) in a 28-page discus-
sion of cause-in-fact, if one excludes citations to articles with variants of the word “probability”
in the title); Alex Stein, The Domain of Torts, 117 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing
that tort causation doctrines properly reflect both private and public risk-allocation mechanisms
at work); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985) (setting forth
a “necessary element of a sufficient set” (NESS) test for causation); Richard W. Wright, Liability
for Possible Wrongs: Causation, Statistical Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1295, 1295–96 (2008) (disclaiming support for certain implications of his test after being
called to Yale to admit heresy).
53. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2406–07 (2014); Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1431 (2013); Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and
Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 815–29 (2009) (describing the emergence of loss
causation as a focal point in fraud-on-the-market litigation). See generally A.B.A. SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES (2d ed. 2010).
54. See generally U.S. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., OFFICE OF OVER-
SIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS MAJORITY STAFF, A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY:
COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES 12–13, 32–35
(2013), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/0d2b3642-6221-4888-a631-08f2f255
b577/AE5D72CBE7F44F5BFC846BECE22C875B.12.18.13-senate-commerce-committee-re
port-on-data-broker-industry.pdf; FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGO-
RITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
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formation privacy cases involve both probabilistic plaintiffs (i.e., plain-
tiffs as to whom more discrete privacy injuries, such as loss of job
opportunities, are absolutely certain in aggregate but difficult to pre-
dict on an individual level) and probabilistic defendants (i.e., defend-
ants whose conduct contributes in an epidemiological sense to those
injuries).  It therefore might seem to present courts with causal conun-
drums beyond their capacity to resolve.
Yet resistance to assigning liability in cases involving complex, prob-
abilistic causation is not uniform.  Courts deciding tort cases continue
to experiment with new models for assigning legal responsibility.55
Plaintiffs in antitrust and securities cases sometimes manage to con-
vince courts that their econometric models of harm are sufficiently
precise to establish loss causation.56  And here again, the intellectual
property system may also to be leading the way toward a more expan-
sive approach to judicially-enforced accountability.  In Columbia Pic-
tures v. Fung, a copyright case involving allegations of contributory
infringement against a defendant who maintained BitTorrent sites, the
Ninth Circuit observed that “where other individuals and entities pro-
vides services identical to [the defendant’s], causation . . . cannot be
assumed, even though fault is unquestionably present.”57  That did not
end the matter, however.  Instead, the court preserved the possibility
of contributory infringement liability based on some showing of a
“sufficient causal connection” between the defendant’s conduct and
55. See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J.) (reasoning
that “when a negative side effect is demonstrated to be the result of a drug, and the drug was
wrongly prescribed in an unapproved and excessive dosage (i.e., a strong causal link has been
shown), the plaintiff who is injured has generally shown enough to permit the finder of fact to
conclude that the excessive dosage was a substantial factor in producing the harm.”); Alder v.
Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 61 P.3d 1068, 1086–90 (Utah 2002) (holding that plaintiffs who be-
came ill after prolonged exposure to toxic substances need not prove precise levels of exposure
where toxicity was known).
56. On uses of econometric modeling in securities litigation, see S. Austin King, Note, Proffer-
ing the Right Evidence: Proving Loss Causation and Damages under SEC Rule 10b-5, 18 N.C.
BANKING INST. 431, 432 (2014) (reviewing methodologies and describing cases).  For examples
from antitrust, see In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 256
F.R.D. 82, 97 (D. Conn. 2009) (upholding use of econometric model where “price results from
only a small number of variables that are readily determined using publicly available data”); In
re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 666, 678 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“Merely pointing to
economic conditions that may affect the dependent variable is not enough to call into question
the reliability of an econometric model.”).
57. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Perfect
10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction in
infringement action where plaintiif “ha[d] not shown a sufficient causal connection between ir-
reparable harm to [its] business and Google’s operation of its search engine”), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1713 (2012). See generally Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement,
64 VAND. L. REV. 675 (2011) (advocating an epidemiological approach to causation in contribu-
tory infringement cases).
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infringement of the plaintiffs’ copyrights and left open what that
showing would need to entail.58 Fung raises the prospect of some-
thing akin to enterprise liability for (some types of) information in-
termediaries. For the court, that prospect flowed logically from other
evidence clearly suggesting that the defendant knew of and en-
couraged the use of his sites for infringement.59  And, notably, the
question of traceability did not arise, and does not appear even to
have been contemplated, as an objection to justiciability.
As this progression suggests, a decision that a claimed injury is
fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct is only partly about causa-
tion in the cause-in-fact sense.  More generally, such decisions are
about how to interpret and reconcile competing instincts about ac-
countability and fairness.  Today, those decisions often must be made
in the context of emerging categories of networked, probabilistic
harms that cannot be traced to any single cause to the exclusion of all
others.  Courts have real and legitimate reservations about their abil-
ity to do justice in such circumstances but also recognize that refusal
to assign accountability may leave serious harms unremedied.  They
are therefore experimenting—cautiously, and in some contexts more
readily than others—with new methods of assigning responsibility for
complex, probabilistic harms.  The various devices now being offered
as tools for assigning such responsibility—epidemiological models,
econometric modeling of price functions and distributions, and still-
emerging theories about material contribution to copyright infringe-
ment—are examples, each with its own advantages and pitfalls.  By
contrast, a decision to bar information privacy plaintiffs from access to
the courts on the ground that no causal link can fairly be said to exist
cuts off the prospect of institutional experimentation before it can
even begin.
* * *
Under each of these prongs of the standing inquiry, answers to
questions about justiciability seem inextricably bound up with judg-
ments about both value and perceived technological inevitability.  The
process of valuing intellectual property often entails considerable in-
determinacy, but we have become accustomed both to thinking of in-
tellectual properties as amenable to valuation and to thinking that the
court system plays an important role in correcting for certain kinds of
58. Fung, 710 F.3d at 1039.
59. Id. at 1037 (“[I]f one provides a service that can be used to infringe copyrights, with the
manifested intent that the service actually be used in that manner, that person is liable for the
infringement that occurs through the use of the service.”).
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systemic problems that lead to incomplete internalization of bene-
fits.60  Unlike intellectual property disputes but like environmental
disputes and other recent targets of the injury-in-fact doctrine, infor-
mation privacy disputes involve incomplete internalization of costs by
enterprises that generate undeniable economic value.  Disputes about
accountability for collateral damage flowing from value-generating ac-
tivity seem to place the court system in tension with the seemingly
inevitable direction of economic and technological progress.
Here it is important to acknowledge the political and institutional
considerations that have shaped the judicial response to claims of in-
formation privacy injury.  Both leniency toward intellectual property
claims and strictness toward information privacy claims align with the
interests of powerful information businesses that are repeat players in
the litigation system.  But debates about injury-in-fact in the informa-
tion economy do not simply reflect a banal story of interest group
capture.  Rather, they hint at a more complex process involving both
deep capture and institutional path-dependence.  Deep capture—or
capture at the level of ideology—proceeds as well-resourced repeat
players work to craft compelling narratives about the contours of legal
entitlements and the structure of legal institutions.61  During times of
rapid economic and sociotechnical transformation, the institutional
stakes are especially high, and the outcomes described in this Part re-
flect the predictable results.  Both leniency toward intellectual prop-
erty claims and strictness toward information privacy claims align with
narratives about innovation and progress that the content, technology,
and information industries have worked hard to foster.  Those and
other industries also have worked to coopt and reshape foundational
narratives about the conditions of access to the courts, entrenching a
philosophy of limited judicial competence to address systemic harms.
Even as the demands of the networked information economy press
courts for more sustained and thoughtful engagement, repeat-player
arguments about standing in information privacy cases reflect and re-
inforce powerful institutional anxieties.  For judges, focusing narrowly
60. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 37–57, 295–331 (2003).
61. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Lim-
its of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation:
An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Cap-
ture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 222–30 (2003).  The legal and regulatory paradigms that emerged
during the “age of automobility” provide another example of this process in action. See gener-
ally Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile Accidents, Insurance, and the Chal-
lenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 1919 to 1941, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 521 (1998); Robin L.
West, Gatsby and Tort, in AMERICAN GUY 86 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds.,
2014).
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on discrete, particularized harms promises both a return to the judicial
system’s undisputed home turf and a reliable strategy for avoiding the
uncertainties that attend intervention in complex, far-flung soci-
otechnical activities.  The arguments about lack of harm, lack of immi-
nence, and lack of causal connection advanced by information privacy
defendants rest on tightly constructed syllogisms that verge on circu-
larity—a justiciable “controversy” requires actual, concrete injury; the
requirement of actual, concrete injury enables courts to avoid issuing
advisory opinions; courts should avoid issuing advisory opinions be-
cause their core competence lies in the resolution of actual controver-
sies; and so on.  Whether or not that reasoning can stand on its own
regarding what actually qualifies as a “controversy” is not really the
point, however.  The injury-in-fact inquiry underscores the complexity
and sociotechnical intractability of economic power.  And so judicial
consensus about the nonjusticiability of certain kinds of claims begins
to harden in ways that appear neutral and inevitable but cannot help
being ideologically inflected.
III. PRIVACY LITIGATION AND INSTITUTIONAL RESISTANCE
TO MASS JUSTICE CLAIMS
Information privacy lawsuits that are deemed to present justiciable
claims for relief next confront another apparent institutional mis-
match, which has to do with the nature of the procedures available for
achieving mass justice through litigation.  The court system has al-
ready undergone one process of partial retrofitting as an institutional
vehicle for mass justice claims.  That process began in the early twenti-
eth century and slowly gathered momentum as new procedures were
devised to handle claims of injury stemming from mass-manufactured
and mass-marketed consumer goods.  As both consumer products and
services and related theories of personal and economic harm have be-
come more complex, however, and as the number of complaints has
mushroomed, the judicial system has come under acute logistical and
political strain.  The combination of overload and repeat-player resis-
tance has produced the procedural model that Judith Resnik calls
“managerial”: a system focused on processing mass claims efficiently
through its various stages rather than on pausing over the systemic
justice issues that those claims may raise.62  Information privacy dis-
putes have several features that appear to underscore the case for
managerial justice, and those features have made them especially ef-
62. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 4, at 386–414.
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fective vehicles for accelerating institutional resistance to mass justice
claims.
A. Fooled Us Once, Fooled Us Twice? Mass Waiver and the
Jurisprudence of Resignation
A distinctive and much-remarked feature of the contemporary liti-
gation landscape is increasing use of private dispute resolution mecha-
nisms as substitutes for judicial process.63  In a wide variety of
contexts ranging from employment contracts to service contracts to
one-off consumer transactions, the Court has become more and more
willing to require enforcement of boilerplate clauses requiring arbitra-
tion of disputes and waiver of the right to bring class claims.64  As a
result of that stance, the use of such clauses is becoming increasingly
widespread.65  Information privacy litigation brings something new to
the table, however.  In networked information interactions that in-
volve collection of personal information, terms of service agreements
do not simply seek to enshrine arbitration clauses.  They also attempt
to require users of information networks to give broad prospective
consent to information collection and use, thereby effectively dis-
claiming any argument that mass data harvesting constitutes injury in
the first place.
Debates about the validity of boilerplate arbitration clauses and
boilerplate waivers follow a now-predictable path.  Advocates argue
that transactions mediated by boilerplate are consensual, and should
63. See generally Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of
Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371 (2016); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of
Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private
Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012); Judith Resnik,
Reinventing Courts as Democratic Institutions, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 9.
64. See DirectTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 469 (2015) (enforcing class arbitration
waiver even though it stated that the entire arbitration clause was “unenforceable” if the waiver
was unenforceable in “the law of your state” and the waiver was signed prior to Concepcion);
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (enforcing class arbitration
waiver that prevented plaintiffs from bringing an antitrust class action against defendant); Nitro-
Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2012) (holding that validity of a non-compete
clause was subject to arbitration in light of arbitration clause in the same contract); Marmet
Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 531–33 (2012) (holding that Federal Arbitration
Act preempted West Virginia law characterizing arbitration clauses covering personal injury or
wrongful death claims as antithetical to public policy); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565
U.S. 95, 101–02 (2012) (enforcing class arbitration waiver that applied to claims brought under
Credit Repair Organizations Act); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011)
(holding that Federal Arbitration Act preempted California law characterizing class arbitration
waivers as unconscionable).
65. See Gilles, supra note 63, at 400–09; Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How Amer- R
ican Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 n.9, 1344–45 (2015).
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be treated that way unless the party seeking invalidation can satisfy
the traditional common-law standard of unconscionability.  Boiler-
plate restrictions, they sometimes add, have been vehicles for compet-
itive innovation, reducing potentially ruinous litigation costs and
enabling companies to offer a wide variety of goods and services on a
more cost-effective basis.66  Critics argue that the widespread prolifer-
ation of boilerplate effectively substitutes private regulation for many
matters in which the law should take a more active interest, and that
the traditional unconscionability standard is wholly inadequate to de-
scribe what is troubling about modern marketplace relationships.67
The rhetoric of consent, they argue, conceals a vanishingly thin con-
ception of individual agency, consisting of little more than the ability
to decline a transaction.  On that view, notice-and-consent is more
properly characterized as notice-and-waiver.
Challenges to the validity of boilerplate waivers generally have not
persuaded courts, but the expansive scope afforded for practices of
notice-and-waiver in the information privacy context is unlike that in
any other area of substantive law.  Although the Court has extended
the reach of arbitration more and more widely, it also has consistently
insisted that requiring arbitration is not the same thing as requiring
individuals to waive their statutory rights altogether.68  Whether or
not that is right as a general matter, the purported distinction between
preservation of claims and consensual waiver of litigation fails utterly
66. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical
Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 840 (2008) (arguing that arbitration’s lower costs in-
crease access to fora for dispute resolution); Jason S. Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Eco-
nomic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between
Businesses and Customers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 879 (2006) (arguing that boilerplate clauses
have reputational value and affect bargaining on that basis); Steven J. Ware, Paying the Price of
Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89 (2001)
(arguing that the cost savings from arbitration are passed on to consumers through competitive
pricing).
67. See generally NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS
(2013); MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW (2013).
68. See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (“The class-action waiver merely limits arbitration to
the two contracting parties. It no more eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their statutory
remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938.”); 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 265 (2009) (noting “that federal antidiscrimination rights
may not be prospectively waived” but holding that agreement to arbitrate does not automatically
amount  to “a prospective waiver of the substantive right”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985) (“[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and
choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue
statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the
agreement as against public policy.”).  Critics argue that these decisions define statutory rights so
narrowly and formalistically that they pay only lip service to the preservation of substantive
claims. See Glover, Disappearing Claims, supra note 63, at 3076–83. R
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in the information privacy context because the reigning conceptualiza-
tion of privacy interests as processes of self-management locates con-
sent—and hence the possibility of waiver—at the very core of the
entitlement.69 Waiver is ordinary and expected and therefore un-
troubling to courts even when it attaches to all uses of information
now or hereafter contemplated.
Courts do recognize that consent for one purpose does not auto-
matically translate into consent for all purposes, and this limitation
imposes certain procedural constraints on the implementation of no-
tice-and-waiver strategies.  Effective waiver requires attention to site
design, and as a pair of recent opinions from the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits makes clear, not just anything will do.70  Among other things,
an information provider must make clear that the waiver relates to the
collection and processing of personal information, as opposed to other
matters, and users must be given the opportunity to review the full set
of disclosures and to accept the terms or reject the transaction.71
There is good reason to doubt, however, that the format changes
deemed so significant by the courts matter much, or at all, to users.
First, decades’ worth of research on consumer behavior makes clear
that consent is highly dependent on the way a transaction framed and
therefore is highly manipulable.72  More generally, the literature on
the behavioral economics of information privacy contains a growing
wealth of evidence related to user comprehension of the disclosures in
privacy policies and user behavior in response to those disclosures.
That evidence describes circumstances that are very different than
those posited by the privacy self-management paradigm.73  By design,
privacy policies convey very little specific information about how con-
sumer information will be used, nor do they attempt to explain the
tradeoffs inherent in an information economy based on mass data har-
vesting, and users generally do not attempt to locate such information
en route to making fully informed decisions.  Instead, user behaviors
and choices with regard to information privacy are most aptly charac-
terized not by knowledge and consent, but rather by resignation.74
69. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013).
70. See Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 2016); Lee v. Intelius, 737
F.3d 1254, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 2013).
71. Lee, 737 F.3d at 1260, 1262; Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1035–36.
72. For good summaries, see Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1309, 1322–25 (2015); Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1155, 1170–1200 (2013).
73. Alessandro Acquisti et al., The Economics of Privacy, J. ECON. LIT., June 2016, at 442–43.
74. Joseph Turow et al., The Tradeoff Fallacy: How Marketers Are Misrepresenting American
Consumers and Opening Them Up to Exploitation, ANNENBERG SCH. COMM., June 2015, at 7; see
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Although consumers sometimes may choose among different provid-
ers of particular services, the decision to enter the relational landscape
of the twenty-first century information society is not a choice and the
conditions of entry are not open to negotiation.  Under the circum-
stances, consumers who decline to spend hours parsing their own data
trails are behaving rationally, but resignation is not the same as
consent.
The current climate of extreme deference to (presumed) consumer
waiver has produced a powerful historical irony.  As Part II.C dis-
cussed, at the dawn of the mass manufacturing age, the concept of
privity of contract was deployed to minimize manufacturer liability to
those injured by defective products even when injury to someone was
foreseeable.  Relying on Winterbottom v. Wright, a nineteenth-century
English case in which denial of liability flowed in part from the form
of pleading that the plaintiff had selected, manufacturers of consumer
goods wove a compelling tale within which privity functioned as a nec-
essary and appropriate safeguard against potentially unlimited liabil-
ity.75  Today, as a new generation of consumer-service purveyors seek
to limit liability for information harms, they deploy (radically reenvi-
sioned) concepts of privity to keep consumers close, barring them
from asserting a variety of claims that the conduct of information busi-
nesses otherwise might support.
The definitive twentieth-century rejoinder to Winterbottom was
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court offered a detailed and decisive rejection of a car manufacturer’s
attempt to rely on a contract-based theory of warranty disclaimer to
limit its liability for harms caused by defective manufacture.76  Today’s
users are required to interact with disclaimers more actively by click-
ing through agreements to waive their claims, but that difference
likely is not one that would have persuaded the Henningsen court to
also Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical Investigation into How Com-
plying with a Privacy Notice Is Related to Meeting Privacy Expectations Online, 34 J. PUB. POL’Y
& MKTG. 210 (2015); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language
Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2017).
75. Winterbottom v. Wright [1842] 152 ENG. REP. 402, 405 (Exch.); see Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80–84 (N.J. 1960) (discussing the privity requirement’s unsuita-
bility to the modern economy and the growing momentum to reject it); Priest, supra note 48 R
(tracing the gradual abandonment of privity-based theories of duty en route to the modern view
of enterprise liability); Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981) (arguing that in the pre-industrial legal system, sta-
tus-based no-duty rubrics produced a generally prevailing no-liability rule).
76. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 84.  The Henningsen court attempted to develop a more robust
warranty of nondefectiveness sounding in tort; ultimately, however, the evolution of strict prod-
ucts liability took a different path. See sources cited supra note 48.
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adopt a different rule about the enforceability of blanket disclaimers.
Instead, that court focused squarely on the relational objections to
abusive consumer contracting practices.77
In the intervening decades, however, the strange has become famil-
iar.  Form contracts have become the norm, and courts confronted
with unthinkable numbers of transactions and relationships mediated
by boilerplate have lost interest in parsing the terms of such arrange-
ments.  Emboldened by judicial inattention, information businesses
now routinely use boilerplate terms to rearrange default entitlements
and obligations covering a wide variety of matters.78  Virtual agree-
ments defining a broad range of permitted information practices and a
narrow and possibly nonexistent range of permitted remedies sketch
an information environment characterized by starkly uneven distribu-
tions of power.  In validating those agreements, consent-based dismis-
sals of information privacy claims constitute a powerful statement of
institutional disengagement from the conditions of contemporary
commercial life.
B. Mass Data Harvesting as Extremely Widespread and
Incredibly Uncommon Injury
Some information privacy claims, typically those alleging unautho-
rized disclosure to or use of personal information by third parties,
evade blanket defenses based on waiver.79  Plaintiffs who seek class
certification for such claims, however, may face technical and concep-
tual challenges that are more complex than those surrounding other
types of consumer class actions. Both the technologically mediated
character of information privacy violations and the presumed variabil-
77. The gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer in the au-
tomobile industry is thus apparent.  There is no competition among the car makers in
the area of the express warranty.  Where can the buyer go to negotiate for better pro-
tection?  Such control and limitation of his remedies are inimical to the public welfare
and, at the very least, call for great care by the courts to avoid injustice through applica-
tion of strict common-law principles of freedom of contract.  Because there is no com-
petition among the motor vehicle manufacturers with respect to the scope of protection
guaranteed to the buyer, there is no incentive on their part to stimulate good will in
that field of public relations.
Id. at 87.
78. For good discussions of this shift, see generally KIM, supra note 67; RADIN, supra note 67. R
79. For example, the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act prohibits the unautho-
rized interception and disclosure of wire and electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1) (2012).  Assuming for purposes of this section that emerging conventions for notice-
and-waiver convey valid consent, an email provider such as Google can determine whether its
own customers have consented to have their emails scanned for purposes of targeted marketing.
It cannot, however, easily determine consent for its customers’ correspondents who are not
Google customers.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 28  8-JUN-17 12:42
562 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:535
ity of privacy effects have presented courts with new opportunities to
deny or limit class treatment.
To begin with, the actions of today’s giant information businesses
may implicate so many consumers, in such technically arcane ways,
that simply delineating the class is quite difficult.80  In class actions
involving consumer products, courts traditionally have not required
the named plaintiffs to demonstrate their ability to identify absolutely
every purchaser; if such a showing were required, no consumer class
action would ever be certified.81  Interactions involving consumers’
personally identifying information, however, often are embedded
deeply within the operating protocols of mobile phones or web brows-
ers and may involve complex commercial relationships among multi-
ple companies.  When firms that benefit from those complex,
networked arrangements are accused of violating information privacy
statutes, they often argue that the methods proposed for ascertaining
the group of affected consumers are just too imprecise and conceal
too much possible variation.  For example, in litigation alleging that
media streaming service Hulu’s technical protocols violated the Video
Privacy Protection Act by disclosing viewing selections and personally
identifying information to third parties, the arguments about class def-
inition required detailed expert analysis of the technical protocols
used by both Hulu and Facebook to keep track of users.  Hulu argued
that class membership could not be verified accurately due to the
number of possible variables affecting user tracking.82  Defendants
also argue that broad class definitions in actions for statutory damages
threaten them with potentially crippling liability—an objection that
seems to boil down to the proposition that some classes are just “too
big to certify.”83  Courts reject some of these ascertainability chal-
lenges, but they also routinely decline requests to certify classes con-
80. In most circuits, a putative class plaintiff must prove that a proposed class is both suffi-
ciently numerous to warrant class-based adjudication and sufficiently definite that its member-
ship is ascertainable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d
583, 592–93 (3d Cir. 2012). But see Mullins v. Direct Dig. LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657–58 (7th Cir.
2015) (“Nothing in Rule 23 mentions or implies this heightened requirement under Rule
23(b)(3), which has the effect of skewing the balance that district courts must strike when decid-
ing whether to certify classes.”).
81. See, e.g., In re Scotts EZ Seed Litig., 304 F.R.D. 397, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Ries v. Ariz.
Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 535 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
82. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C-11-037640-LB, 2014 WL 2758598, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
18, 2014).
83. For detailed consideration of this question, see Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.,
331 F.3d 13, 25–29 (2d Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring) (suggesting that very large aggre-
gated awards threaten due process violations and arguing that courts should construe statutory
damages provisions as authorizing smaller awards to each individual class member); Bert I.
Huang, Surprisingly Punitive Damages, 100 VA. L. REV. 1027, 1046–56 (2014).
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sisting of all consumers affected by the challenged activity, opting
instead to certify subclasses whose involvement can be verified more
precisely.84
Another set of challenges relates to the showing that common ques-
tions of fact or law predominate over individualized issues.85  Here an
initial problem relates, again, to waiver; this time reframed as an ob-
stacle to mass disposition.  For example, when non-Gmail customers
sued Google under the wiretap laws for unauthorized scanning of
emails that they had sent to or received from holders of Gmail ac-
counts, the district court noted that questions about knowledge and
waiver were integral to resolution of those claims.  It reasoned that—
in part because of Google’s continual and widely publicized revisions
of its privacy disclosures—such questions required individualized res-
olution, and it therefore concluded that the putative class action there-
fore presented insufficient predominance of common issues relating to
injury.86  In some metaphysical sense, that reasoning may even be
right: Perhaps it is only in our failure to acquiesce unthinkingly to the
practices of mass data harvesting that have become our background
reality that we emerge as individuals.  But there is an undeniable ten-
sion between the reasoning that imputes consent—purportedly the ul-
timate autonomous act87—based on acts performed unthinkingly and
en masse and the reasoning that infers individuality from the absence
of an opportunity to click.  In neither case, moreover, does preserving
actual autonomy for users of networked information services seem to
be the point of the exercise.  Both kinds of reasoning avoid con-
fronting the underlying claims of injury, which allege a persistent pat-
tern of industry conduct directed toward total electronic surveillance
of consumers.
84. See, e.g., Opperman v. Path, Inc., No. 13-cv-00453-JST, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92403, at *8
(N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) (declining to certify class of all users of the invasive versions of Path’s
software and instead limiting class to those registered as users during four-month period in
which the software downloaded iDevice Contacts from all users); In re Anthem, Inc. Data
Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 WL 3029783, at *26 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016) (limit-
ing class to those consumers who had already paid for credit monitoring or stated that they had
expended personal time on credit monitoring); In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2014 WL 2758598, at
*14 (denying without prejudice motion to certify class of “users of both Facebook and Hulu
during the class period” and suggesting possible methods of defining subclasses based on vari-
ables such as whether users remained logged in and whether and how they cleared cookies).
85. That showing is required in actions for monetary relief certified under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3).
86. In re Google, Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 12-MD-02430-LHK, 2014 WL 1102660, at *13–21
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014); see also Backhaut v. Apple Inc., 2015 WL 4776427, at *14–15 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (following reasoning in In re Google).
87. See RADIN, supra note 67, at 82–98; Robin Kar, Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. CHI. L. R
REV. 759, 808–12 (2016).
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Even when consent is not the critical issue, a proposed class may
still fail the predominance inquiry if the court thinks that the asserted
injury is too individualized to make aggregate disposition feasible.
Like other would-be class claimants, information privacy litigants al-
leging a structural theory of wrongdoing in which common issues
predominate must contend with the Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart
Stores v. Dukes, which reversed the certification of a nationwide class
of female Wal-Mart employees alleging a pattern of discrimination in
pay and promotion.88  Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Scalia
reasoned that because of the discretion surrounding pay and promo-
tion decisions, the plaintiffs had not shown and could not show that
they had all been discriminated against in the same way.89  Informa-
tion privacy defendants now routinely argue that Dukes should defeat
certification of claims alleging enterprise-wide violations of informa-
tion privacy rights.  As support for that position, they rely on the argu-
ments about the irreducible individuality of privacy harm that have
proved so appealing to courts in the standing context.90
Most lower courts, however, have found class claims for violation of
statutory information privacy rights more closely analogous to con-
sumer class actions and therefore more aptly controlled by other
strands of the Court’s class action jurisprudence.  To borrow a distinc-
tion suggested by the late Richard Nagareda, some information-era
class complaints assert structural theories of civil wrongdoing roughly
analogous to mass torts while others “involve the invocation of mar-
kets as the source of some common wrong.”91  For cases in the latter
category, certification is the ordinary result, though it may be avoided
88. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011).
89. Id. at 352 (“Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together,
it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will pro-
duce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.”).  In fact, managerial
discretion played a key role in the Dukes plaintiffs’ theory of the case; they argued that the
discretion permitted by company policy had allowed a pattern or practice of discrimination
based on social stereotyping to take root. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 355; see id. at 371 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (“Wal-Mart’s supervisors do not make their discretionary decisions in a vac-
uum. . . . The plaintiffs’ evidence, including class members’ tales of their own experiences,
suggests that gender bias suffused Wal-Mart’s company culture.” (footnotes omitted)).  As com-
mentators have noted, the reversal of certification likely reflects the majority’s rejection of that
theory, which advances a contested interpretation of the governing law.  See Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1057–58 (2013); see
also Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
97 (arguing, pre-Dukes, that many class certification disputes really are disputes about the un-
derlying substantive law).
90. See, e.g., Bee, Denning, Inc. v. Capital All. Grp., 310 F.R.D. 614, 626 (S.D. Cal. 2015);
Gossoo v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV-13-2043-SVW, 2013 WL 5651271, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9,
2013).
91. See Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 89 at 133–35. R
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if the market is complex and the plaintiff’s expert economic report
does not isolate the alleged market effect with sufficient precision.92
As noted in Part II.A, many information privacy statutes authorize
statutory damages, and some also authorize awards of profits from the
unlawful activity.  Arguably, claims for those remedies invoke legisla-
tive classifications of privacy harms as market-originating harms, for
which all plaintiffs are entitled to uniform redress.  Courts have used
variants of this theory to certify classes in a number of cases, and have
reasoned that even the prospect of an individuated damages determi-
nation need not defeat certification when all claims stem from the
same alleged statutory violation.93
A judge in the influential Northern District of California, though,
recently indicated that lack of predominance of common questions as
to remedy may be an avenue for refusing to certify statutory informa-
tion privacy claims.  The context was a lawsuit brought against
Facebook for scanning private messages sent between its users, and
the guiding decision was not Wal-Mart v. Dukes, but rather Comcast v.
Behrend, a consumer antitrust action alleging illegal acquisition of
monopoly power in a regional cable television market.94  According to
a five-justice majority of the Court, the proposed class failed the pre-
dominance test because the statistical model proffered for measuring
damages on a class-wide basis did not measure only the precise dam-
ages attributable to the particular antitrust injury alleged.95
As Comcast illustrates, some types of market-originating harms
must be modeled, and the need for modeling to isolate the relevant
portion of Facebook’s profits allowed reasoning about the inherently
92. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416–17 (2014) (holding
that fraud-on-the-market defendant may contest loss causation at the certification stage); Com-
cast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433–34 (2013) (holding that antitrust defendant may
contest ability of plaintiff’s model to isolate antitrust impact with sufficient precision at the certi-
fication stage); Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 89, at 135–49. Dukes, by contrast, falls R
into the former category. See Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 89, at 158 (criticizing R
later-reversed appellate decision in Dukes and analogizing plaintiffs’ theory of discrimination to
theories of “enabling torts” urged by some scholars to impose liability on facilitators of systemic
harm).
93. See, e.g., Eggen v. Westsconsin Credit Union, No. 14-cv-873-bbc, 2016 WL 2642255, at *1
(W.D. Wis. May 6, 2016) (Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act); Bee, Denning, Inc. v. Capital All.
Grp., 310 F.R.D. 614, 625 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (Telephone Consumer Protection Act); Larson v.
Trans Union LLC, No. 12-cv-05726-WTD, 2015 WL 3945052, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2015)
(Fair Credit Reporting Act); In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. c-11-03764-LB, 2014 WL 2758598, at
*12 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 17, 2014) (Video Privacy Protection Act); see also Opperman v. Path, Inc.,
No. 12-cv-00453-JST, 2016 WL 3844326 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) (tortious intrusion upon
seclusion).
94. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
95. Id. at 1433.
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individualized nature of privacy harm to find a new point of entry.
The plaintiffs in Campbell v. Facebook supported their claim for ill-
gotten profits with an economic model that used a series of inferences
and assumptions to isolate the portion of Facebook’s profits resulting
from the challenged message-scanning activity.96  Citing Comcast, the
district court took issue with several of the model’s assumptions about
that allocation and also criticized the decision to allocate an equal
fractional share of those profits to each private message scanned.  The
court thought it wrong to assume that all customers and all messages
were equally profitable and therefore concluded that common ques-
tions did not predominate in the claim for profits.97  It further con-
cluded that because awards of statutory damages under the wiretap
laws are committed to the court’s discretion, such decisions require
consideration of each claimant’s circumstances, so common questions
did not predominate in the claim for statutory damages either.98  That
reasoning relies on the presumption of inherently individualized pri-
vacy injury from start to finish.  Its logical implication is that in infor-
mation privacy litigation, no class claims may be maintained for
monetary relief of any sort, even when the wrongdoing consists of
market-wide conduct for which Congress has provided a uniform
remedy.
The combined reasoning of the Google Gmail and Campbell opin-
ions may signal newly uncertain prospects for class-wide monetary re-
lief in information privacy litigation, or at least for such relief under
the wiretap laws.  It is difficult to make such predictions, though, both
because the larger class action landscape continues to shift and be-
cause the torrent of information privacy class actions continues to
grow.  A week after the certification motion in Campbell v. Facebook
was argued and submitted, the Court held in Tyson Foods v.
Bouaphakeo that plaintiffs in an action for back pay under the Fair
Labor Standards Act could use statistical evidence to establish the
predominance of common questions as to liability where the evidence
filled a gap created by the employer’s failure to keep proper records
and each individual plaintiff would have needed to rely on the same
evidence to sue separately.99  Arguably, that reasoning changes the
result in cases like Campbell, but there are also important differences
between the two fact patterns.  In particular, Tyson Foods involved a
96. Campbell v. Facebook Inc., No. 13-cv-5996-PJH, 2016 WL 2897936, at *13 (N.D. Cal. May
18, 2016).
97. Id. at *13–14.
98. Id. at *14–15.
99. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046-47 (2016).
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statute that the Court traditionally has construed liberally and a de-
fendant that was already operating under a federal injunction to cor-
rect the challenged practices; Campbell, in contrast, expresses the
usual skepticism about whether privacy harms even exist. Addition-
ally, to the extent that future questions about statistical evidence and
predominance turn on the Court’s view of the underlying substantive
question; Comcast may more accurately reflect the Court’s consist-
ently dismissive stance toward class action litigation involving low-dol-
lar, high-volume consumer claims.100
Information privacy plaintiffs asserting structural theories of wrong-
doing still may be able to assert class claims for injunctive or declara-
tory relief under Rule 23(b)(2), which does not require a
predominance inquiry.101  It is unclear, however, whether courts will
be willing to craft discovery and remedial orders of sufficient breadth.
So far, the results are not encouraging.  The Campbell court did grant
a Rule 23(b)(2) certification, but then denied plaintiffs’ motion to
compel discovery about the particulars of Facebook’s message-scan-
ning functionality over the three-year period in suit.102  The judge who
presided over the Google Gmail litigation recently certified a Rule
23(b)(2) class action against Yahoo for unauthorized email scanning,
but then approved a narrowly drafted settlement that left Yahoo free
to scan emails once they were no longer “in transit.”103
C. The Filing-to-Settlement Pipeline and the
Sublimation of Remedies
Debates about the standards for certification of information privacy
class actions, however, may prove to be largely irrelevant for a reason
that is far more fundamental: To the extent that information privacy
100. See generally J. Maria Glover, Procedural Formalism and the Supreme Court’s “Non-
Trans-Substantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that the sub-
stantive question is the key in statistical evidence cases but suggesting that Tyson Foods and
Comcast cannot be reconciled).
101. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (requiring a determination that “the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class”).
102. Campbell, 2016 WL 2897936, at *15–16; see also Campbell v. Facebook Inc., 2016 WL
7888026 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016).
103. In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 601 (N.D. Cal. 2015); David Kravets, The Most
Absurd Internet Privacy Class-Action Settlement Ever, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 30, 2016), https://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/08/the-most-absurd-internet-privacy-class-action-settlement-
ever/ (describing eventual settlement in the Yahoo litigation, which leaves Yahoo free to scan
emails once they are no longer “in transit”); see also Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 239
F.R.D. 318, 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (declining to certify Rule 23(b)(2) settlement class in action for
sale of subscriber personal information because “the defendants in this case altered their prac-
tices almost immediately with respect to the language of the original notice as well as the list
sales business itself”).
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lawsuits continue to move forward, whether as class actions or as indi-
vidual actions, they do not seem to be getting litigated.  Like contem-
porary mass tort claims, most information privacy claims against large
information businesses are funneled into consolidated multidistrict lit-
igation proceedings.  There, the claims that are denied class certifica-
tion seem to disappear, while those certified as class actions tend to
settle for amounts that, though widely publicized, in fact are relatively
trivial.104  Some of those settlements, moreover, have begun to follow
an unusual path, coopting a device traditionally used for distribution
of residual settlement funds to route payments to third parties and
denying individual plaintiffs any recovery at all.
Scholars who specialize in complex litigation have begun to pay
close attention to the federal courts’ increasingly heavy reliance on
consolidated multidistrict litigation (MDL) proceedings as a way of
aggregating certain types of individual claims for more efficient
processing.105  Relative to class actions, MDL proceedings allow
courts more flexibility in identifying common issues, grouping cases,
and crafting comprehensive settlement decrees, a comparative advan-
tage that has increased as the Court has ratcheted back access to class
actions.106  Class actions, however, have the benefit of formal identifi-
104. See, e.g., Wendy Davis, comScore Agrees to $14 Million Privacy Settlement with Panelists,
MEDIAPOST (June 3, 2014, 3:44 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/227210/
comscore-agrees-to-14-million-privacy-settlement.html; Ahiza Garcia, Target Settles for $39 Mil-
lion Over Data Breach, CNN (Dec. 2, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/02/news/
companies/target-data-breach-settlement/ (describing settlements totaling $39 million to banks,
$10 million to customers, and $67 million to Visa); Vindu Goel, LinkedIn Settles Class-Action
Suit Over Weak Password Security, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Feb. 23, 2015, 11:08 AM), https://
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/linkedin-settles-class-action-suit-over-weak-password-secur-
ity/?_r=0 (noting the $1.25 million settlement fund); Brent Kendall, Facebook’s Settlement on
‘Beacon’ Service Survives Challenge, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2013, 4:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702303936904579177622940903610 ($9.5 million); Jim Puzzanghera,
AT&T to Pay $25 Million to Settle Probe of Call Center Data Breaches, L.A. TIMES (April 8,
2015, 10:57 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-att-data-breach-fcc-settlement-20150408-
story.html; Ryan Singel, Online Tracking Firm Settles Suit Over Undeletable Cookies, WIRED
(Dec. 5, 2010, 2:02 AM), http://www.wired.com/2010/12/zombie-cookie-settlement/ ($2.4 mil-
lion); Ross Todd, Phone Makers Settle Carrier IQ Privacy Suits, RECORDER (Jan. 25, 2016), http:/
/www.therecorder.com/id=1202747932772/Phone-Makers-Settle-Carrier-IQ-Privacy-Suits?slre
turn=20160701054508.
105. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 71 (2015); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2009); J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the Post-Class
Action Era: The Problems and Promise of Non-Removable State Actions in Multi-District Litiga-
tion, 5 J. TORT L. 1 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT.
REV. 183, 214–20 (2008); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576
(2008); see also Deborah R. Hensler, Justice for the Masses? Aggregate Litigation and Its Alterna-
tives, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 73.
106. See Glover, Mass Litigation, supra note 105, at 1–3; Glover, The Structural Role of Pri- R
vate Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, supra note 63, at 1213–14. R
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cation of common issues and are subject to regularized procedural
rules, while MDL proceedings are more opaque.107  Any procedural
advantage that accrues to class actions may be illusory, though, be-
cause many putative class actions move into MDL before being certi-
fied and most cases settle while still in the preliminary stages, so the
certification decision is made in the context of a motion to certify a
settlement class.108
Information privacy litigation has followed the general patterns of
opacity and orientation toward settlement that those scholars identify.
Once inside the MDL process, formerly headline-grabbing lawsuits
have seemingly vanished.  For example, litigation over whether the
Google Street View program had violated federal wiretap laws by in-
structing its vehicles to detect and map private wireless networks pro-
duced a widely-publicized appeal to the Ninth Circuit.  Once the
Ninth Circuit held that the litigation could proceed and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari on the statutory interpretation question, the
lawsuit was cleared to move forward.109  That was 2014, and as of this
writing the court has not yet ruled on the request for class
certification.
The few lawsuits that are certified as class actions tend to settle
soon afterward for dollar amounts that seem large in absolute terms—
as, for example, with the $9.5 million Facebook Beacon payout or the
$8.5 million Google Buzz payout—but that are minimal relative to the
number of individuals affected and more minimal still when measured
against the profits resulting from the challenged activity.110  Put differ-
ently, a consequence of treating information privacy class actions as
analogous to consumer class actions is that information privacy settle-
ments tend to be priced as though the challenged conduct had pro-
duced no effects more significant than a one-time overpayment.  The
failure to price information privacy violations as wrongs producing
substantial, continuing effects has had clear and predictable results.
Information privacy settlements are widely regarded as having pro-
duced almost no meaningful change in business practices relating to
107. See Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 105, at 79–84. R
108. See, e.g., In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 309 F.R.D. 573, 584 (N.D. Cal. 2015); In re
Netflix Privacy Litig., No. 11-CV-00379-EJD, 2012 WL 2598819, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2012);
In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., No. 10-cv-04809-EJD, 2014 WL 1266091, at *2–4
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014).
109. In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Comm’n Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2011),
aff’d, 729 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2013), amended on reh’g sub nom. by Joffe v. Google, Inc., 746 F.3d
920, (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2877 (2014).
110. For discussion of this point and detailed analysis of several recent settlements, see gener-
ally Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Enforcing Privacy Rights: Class Action Litigation and the
Challenge of Cy Pres, in ENFORCING PRIVACY (David Wright & Paul de Hert eds., 2015).
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the collection, processing, and exchange of consumer personal
information.111
In a growing number of information privacy cases, the court-ap-
proved settlements forego individual compensation entirely.  Instead,
those settlements adopt the cy pres device, which in recent history had
been used principally as a device for disposing of unclaimed settle-
ment funds by rerouting them to beneficiaries who might serve the
purposes of the settlement.112  At the urging of information businesses
and the information privacy bar, it is becoming a device for diverting
settlement funds in their entirety.  The bulk of the Facebook Beacon
settlement, for example, was conveyed to a newly-established entity,
the Digital Trust Foundation, governed by a board that included a
Facebook employee, to disburse the funds as grants to law schools and
public interest organizations for projects to educate consumers on is-
sues of online privacy and security.113  The Ninth Circuit approved the
arrangement, reasoning that the proposed use bore a “substantial
nexus to the interests of the class members.”114  As the grants were
doled out, what had seemed a substantial sum seemed to undergo a
process of sublimation.  Like ice suddenly transformed into air, it van-
ished, leaving only the barest traces that it had ever existed.  Mean-
while, Facebook—prohibited only from continuing the Beacon
program under its original name—devised very similar programs to
replace it.
The ostensible rationale for cy pres settlements in information pri-
vacy cases is that, since the costs of distributing payments to each class
member would exceed the individual payment amounts, the funds
should be put to the next best use.  That reasoning, though, validates
the ongoing construction of privacy harms as minor inconveniences,
worth less to the average consumer than the costs of a faulty digital
storage device or an overcharge from an ebook store.115  And condi-
111. See id. at 325–26; see also Kravets, supra note 103.  This does not mean that there have R
been no changes in firm behavior. See generally KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MUL-
LIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES
AND EUROPE (2015) (discussing emergence of privacy compliance culture and management
structures within firms).
112. For a review of the doctrine and its history, see Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class
Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 114–17 (2014).
113. See Rotenberg & Jacobs, supra note 111, at 321.
114. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
115. See, e.g., In re Nvidia GTX 970 Graphics Chip Litig., No. 4:155-cv-00760 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
7, 2016) (approving settlement entitling eligible consumers to $30 per qualifying device); In re
Optical Disk Drive Antitrust Litig., No. 3:10-md-021430RS (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2016) (approving
settlement entitling eligible consumers to “up to $10” per qualifying device); In re Apple eBooks
Antitrust Litig., ECF No. 686, No. 11-md-02293 (Nov. 21, 2014) (approving settlement entitling
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tioning cy pres awards on commitments to educate the public about
the privacy and security issues generated by the data harvesting activi-
ties of information businesses effectively validates those activities,
reinforcing the notion that privacy erosion is both inevitable and
nonredressable by conventional means.
The jurisprudence of the cy pres settlement is still evolving, so it’s
possible that the courts will impose additional restrictions on its use.
The Ninth Circuit’s approval of the Facebook Beacon arrangement
elicited two strongly worded dissents, and although the Supreme
Court denied certiorari, a rare separate statement by Chief Justice
Roberts signaled that the Court is paying close attention.116  In the
meantime, though, lower courts seem to be embracing the cy pres de-
vice with enthusiasm.117
* * *
Returning to the themes of deep capture and institutional path-de-
pendence that emerged from Part II’s exploration of the injury-in-fact
doctrine, we can see both factors continuing to shape the judicial re-
sponse to those information privacy claims that survive standing chal-
lenges.  For starters, decisions about waiver of claims, class
ascertainability and commonality of injury (or lack thereof), and the
structure of settlement payouts seem inevitably bound up with the
substantive characterizations of privacy injury that Part II explored.
When courts issue decisions dismissing information privacy claims or
deflecting putative class claims, their reasons tend to track the prevail-
ing conceptualization of privacy injury as individualized, evanescent,
and ultimately noncompensable.  Once again, though, struggles over
the proper conceptualization of information privacy litigation also
widen to implicate—and coopt—foundational conceptions of institu-
tional role and structure.  The arguments for dismissing or deflecting
information privacy claims impliedly represent such claims as simulta-
neously too individualized and too widespread to remedy.  They both
rely on and reinforce conceptions of litigation as inherently individual-
eligible consumers to $6.93 for each New York Times bestseller and $1.57 for all other books).
On the possible benchmarking effects of such settlements, see generally Ben DePoorter, Law in
the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil Settlements, 95 CORNELL. L. REV. 957
(2010).
116. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 834 (9th Cir. 2012) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013); Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 709 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2013) (Smith,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
117. See generally Rotenberg & Jacobs, supra note 111; Matt Vella, Google and Facebook’s
New Tactic in the Tech Wars, FORTUNE (July 30, 2012), fortune.com/2012/07/30/google-and-
facebooks-new-tactic-in-the-tech-wars/.
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ized and of judicial institutions as having only limited capacity to ad-
dress mass harms.
The preferred mechanisms for disposing of information privacy
claims—devolution to private ordering, narrowing or dismissal of class
claims on grounds of impermissible variability, sublimation of reme-
dies via cy pres payouts for educational efforts that reinforce the sta-
tus quo—are best understood and evaluated as contingent
institutional formations.  Casting about for new ways of handling un-
familiar logistical and conceptual problems, courts are responding to
strategic interventions by powerful repeat players interested first and
foremost in shielding their business models and information process-
ing practices from judicial oversight.  Through their efforts, a new
model of procedural justice is taking shape—one that comports in
some respects with the demands of the networked information econ-
omy but that also is heavily inflected by the more parochial concerns
of information capitalists.
IV. PRIVACY, POWER, AND THE LOGIC OF JUDICIAL IRRELEVANCE
Why assume, though, that the courts are the appropriate forum in
which to challenge widespread practices of information collection,
processing, and use?  As Part II noted, some privacy scholars have
argued that although the complex questions surrounding information
industry structure and organization have privacy implications, those
questions do not automatically translate into judicially cognizable pri-
vacy injuries.118  The information industries, meanwhile, have consist-
ently argued that striking the proper balance between privacy and
innovation is not a job for courts.119  The arguments advanced in de-
bates about standing and class certification in information privacy
cases parallel those advanced for the last several decades in debates
about the efficacy of mass tort litigation and the desirability of mass
tort reform.  Some have argued that insurance markets can regulate
product safety more effectively, while others maintain that the admin-
istrative state is better-equipped to address complex harms that impli-
cate the structure of entire industries.120
118. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. R
120. For a sampling of perspectives on those questions, see generally THE LIABILITY MAZE:
THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION (Peter W. Huber & Robert E.
Litan eds., 1991); NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW (Walter Olson ed., 1988); TORT LAW AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE CONSUMER WELFARE (Peter
Schuck ed., 1991); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products
Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinksy and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 1928–34
(2010); Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42 STAN.
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While the institutional competence inquiry is important, it also risks
holding constant what ought to be (and in fact already is) in motion.
First and most basically, the relationships between and among courts,
agencies, and the political process are dynamic.  Litigation outcomes
can reinforce administrative inertia or spur administrative action.
More fundamentally, legal institutions are not “fixed, Archimedean
points around which modes of economic development shift and co-
here.”121  Institutional design responds to prevailing modes of eco-
nomic and sociotechnical development, and at times of rapid change
in modes of development, institutions too are in flux.  The questions
now on the table—for courts and administrative entities alike—con-
cern the best paths for institutional evolution in an era when informa-
tionalism is emerging as the prevailing mode of economic
development and when that shift has exposed harms that are systemic,
networked, and collective.122
The patterns of harm and benefit in the networked information
economy are complex and difficult to unravel, and relationships be-
tween business and consumers typically involve instrumentalities that
are much less concrete than cars and soda bottles.  It seems relatively
easy to point to the manufacturing specifications for a glass bottle or a
set of tires but much more complicated to identify the specifications
needed to minimize privacy harms in the networked information envi-
ronment.  It is difficult to agree what might constitute a data process-
ing defect, and the background conventions and practices are
themselves undergoing rapid change.  By comparison with these un-
certainties, the interlinked narratives of virtuous labor and innovation
advanced by the data processing industries to dissuade courts from
interfering with new business models seem compelling.123
L. REV. 539 (1990) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988)); Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 899 (1996); Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649 (1990); Robert L.
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme,
52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993).
121. Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQ. L.
369, 371 (2016).
122. On the shift from industrialism to informationalism, see id. at 370–73. See 1 MANUEL
CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE 14–18 (1996); DAN
SCHILLER, HOW TO THINK ABOUT INFORMATION 3–35 (2007). See generally JAMES R. BENIGER,
THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1986).
123. On the narratives that underpin the personal data processing economy, see generally
Julie E. Cohen, The Surveillance-Innovation Complex: The Irony of the Participation Turn, in
THE PARTICIPATORY CONDITION 207 (Darin Barney et al. eds., forthcoming 2016); Julie E. Co-
hen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction of the Surveillance Economy, 30
PHIL. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-017-0258-2.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 40  8-JUN-17 12:42
574 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:535
And yet the challenges now confronting the courts are less unfamil-
iar than they appear.  Both the products liability revolution and the
emergence of mass torts required new types of inquiries.  As the prod-
ucts liability revolution got underway, assigning liability for manufac-
turing defects required judgments about both the specifications for
individual product units and the design of the factory production line,
and those judgments too had to be made at a time when products and
manufacturing standards were evolving rapidly.  Mass tort litigation
required courts to contend with still more complex harms occurring as
unintended byproducts of development.  Assigning liability for mass
torts required judgments about the effects of chemical or pharmaceu-
tical exposure, and those judgments relied on new epidemiological
constructs for modeling and measuring harms.  Then, as now, manu-
facturers made arguments about the economic value of their activities
and the necessary costs of innovation in production and distribution.
Although courts and legislatures initially accepted manufacturers’
arguments about the costs to innovation, the risks of decision making
under uncertainty, and the jurisprudential pitfalls of probabilistic cau-
sation, they became more skeptical as the toll of those injured by in-
dustrial products and byproducts continued to mount.  Then, as now,
certain types of issues ultimately required institutional settlements
characterized by significant reliance on the regulatory state.  For ex-
ample, courts were not equipped to supervise passive restraint imple-
mentation or other technical standards affecting vehicle
crashworthiness, both matters that are now the subject of detailed reg-
ulations.124  Nor were they equipped to oversee new-drug approval
processes, conduct safety testing on chemicals used in consumer prod-
ucts, or determine ambient pollutant limits.125  At the same time,
though, both product liability litigation and mass tort litigation played
useful roles in catalyzing a societal shift toward a thicker notion of
industrial responsibility.126  And to the extent that the eventual regu-
latory settlements fell short of the standard that some proponents of
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012) (establishing standards for labeling relating to NHTSA’s
crash ratings); 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (establishing vehicle crashworthiness standards); 49 C.F.R.
§ 572 (establishing standards for use of dummies in crash testing).
125. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.1 et seq. (establishing process for new drug approval); 16 C.F.R.
Part 1500 (defining procedures for consumer product safety testing pursuant to the Federal Haz-
ardous Substances Act); 40 C.F.R. Part 50 (establishing standards for ambieint air quality)
126. On the ways that litigation and regulation can facilitate complementary processes of
knowledge production about risk of harm, see generally Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Tech-
nology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137 (1995).
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strict liability may have wanted, that too seems inevitable; institutional
realignment is at its core a process of compromise.127
The question is not whether information privacy litigation alone will
move the information industries toward desired levels of precaution
and accountability, but rather whether a governance system in which
the policy lever of aggregate litigation has been disabled will do so.
Here it is worth considering what would have happened if the courts
in the defective products cases had chosen to treat the risks as struc-
tural and nonredressable, or if the courts in the mass tort cases of the
1970s and 1980s had chosen to treat the harms as too individuated for
mass resolution to make sense.  The result might have been a robust
regime of private safety certification—perhaps with top-drawer rat-
ings bodies such as Underwriters’ Laboratories and Consumer Re-
ports playing a much more prominent role—or it might have been a
regime of administrative controls on consumer product manufacturing
whose reach was far more comprehensive.  Those speculations, how-
ever, do not align well with the patterns of power and disempower-
ment now emerging in the contemporary information economy.
The pressure on our cobbled-together system of partial and largely
consent-based information privacy protections is growing.  The com-
plex patchwork of sector specific fair-information-practices regula-
tions, consent decrees enshrining data security obligations tethered to
evolving industry best practices, and state-specific data breach notifi-
cation laws has produced incomplete and ineffectual protection
127. Nor are the results necessarily durable.  For an extended exploration of efforts over the
last four decades to undo the mid-twentieth-century regulatory settlements in the domains of
product safety, worker safety, and consumer protection, see generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY,
FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (2013).  For exam-
ples of decisions illustrating the back-and-forth between courts and agencies in the domain of
automotive safety, see Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 332 (2011) (hold-
ing that 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, permitting auto manufacturers to choose between lap belts and lap-
and-shoulder belts in rear seats, did not preempt a design defect suit brought under state tort law
because the choice offered to manufacturers was not “a significant regulatory objective”); Geier
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65 (2000) (holding that Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard 208, which established a phase-in period for passive restraints in vehicles, pre-
empted a design defect suit brought under state tort law).  For decisions illustrating similar
processes in federal food and drug regulation, see, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604,
613 (2011) (holding that the FDA’s interpretation of certain regulations as imposing a duty of
“sameness” on generic drug labels preempted a labeling defect suit brought under state tort
law); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558–59 (2009) (holding that FDA labeling regulations did
not preempt a failure-to-warn suit brought under state tort law); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555
U.S. 70, 72–73 (2008) (holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act did not
preempt a suit for fraudulent labeling brought under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act);
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (holding that FDA safety requirements for
catheters preempted a design defect suit brought under state tort law).
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against the growing costs of information entropy.128  There is no regu-
latory entity with general jurisdiction over data protection in the
United States and little momentum to create one.129  Corrective mea-
sures now being put in place by industry consensus, such as the incom-
pletely implemented scheme for microchip-based point-of-sale
protection that replicates some (but not all) features of the more ro-
bust and effective European regime for preventing credit card fraud,
do not seem to be working to stem the flood of payment fraud and
identity theft.130  And almost nothing seems to constrain the bur-
geoning data-processing market, which rewards new methods of sort-
ing consumers for maximal surplus extraction.
As this capsule summary of regulatory dysfunction suggests, moreo-
ver, the administrative state is currently confronting a crisis of its own
with the same root causes.  Across vast sectors of the economy, ad-
ministrative processes are widely regarded as having failed to respond
adequately to the regulatory problems created by the emergence of
informationalism as the principal mode of economic development and
by the increasing  involvement of networked, digital information tech-
nologies in regulated processes of all sorts.131  Regulatory paradigms
like market power and antidiscrimination no longer cohere in a world
characterized by information overload and platform-based, al-
gorithmic intermediation.132  And regulatory processes designed for a
128. On information entropy and its costs, see Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Re-
sponding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1749–50 (2010).
129. The information industries and their advocates in pro-business and libertarian think
tanks have consistently argued that striking the proper balance between privacy and innovation
is not a job for regulators, either. See, e.g., Balancing Privacy and Innovation: Does the Presi-
dent’s Proposal Tip the Scale?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the
H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. 146–49 (2012) (statement of Michael
Zaneis, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Interactive Advert. Bureau); Letter from
Daniel Castro, Dir., Ctr. for Data Innovation, to Nicole Wong, White House Office of Sci. &
Tech. Pol’y (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.itif.org/publications/public-policy-implications-big-data;
see also Larry Downes, A Rational Response to the Privacy “Crisis,” CATO INST. POL’Y ANALY-
SIS (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa716.pdf; Berin Szoka &
Adam Thierer, Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the Harm and Where Are We Heading?,
PROGRESS ON POINT, June 2009, at 1. See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Surveillance-Innovation
Complex, supra note 123. R
130. See, e.g., Erika Harrell, Victims of Identity Theft, 2014, U.S. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
(Sept. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 17.6 Million U.S. Residents Experienced Identity Theft in 2014 (Sept. 27, 2015), http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/vit14pr.cfm.  As Adam Levitin explains, the regime reflects a
pragmatic compromise among banks and payment providers on one hand and merchants on the
other, and also is influenced by the background division of liability for card-present versus card-
not-present (e.g., online) fraud. See Adam J. Levitin, Private Disordering? Payment Card Fraud
Liability Rules, 5 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2010).
131. See generally Cohen, Regulatory State, supra note 121. R
132. See id. at 375–89.
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different era are struggling to assimilate the new regulatory challenges
posed by software-based control of industrial, financial, and informa-
tional activities.133
At a time of institutional ferment that spans multiple branches of
government, it is no answer to say that the risks to consumers from
widespread data harvesting, processing, and exchange are systemic or
structural in a way that forecloses, or ought to foreclose, the very idea
of litigated relief.  The idea that arguments about risk should not be
cognizable as arguments about harm makes sense only if we posit the
risk in question as a background feature of an invariant physical envi-
ronment.  That might make sense if we are thinking about the risk of
being struck by lightning or hit by a falling meteorite.  It is wholly
inadequate as an account of responsibility for risks that arise as con-
tingent and path-dependent features of the built environment.134
More precisely, as we continue busily constructing classes of con-
sumers who lack remedies before the law, it is important to recognize
that the condition of legal disability is artificial and institutionally de-
termined.  This point parallels Lee Fennell’s argument about the ways
that different designs for property institutions redistribute resource
access costs.135  In the context of the tort system, different institutional
design features redistribute the costs of market participation, some-
times allocating those costs in ways that prompt internalization of an
activity’s costs and sometimes allocating costs in other ways.  Con-
versely, if a different pattern of cost distribution is desired, common
law or statutory liability for privacy harms may play a useful role in
forcing it.
By the same token, it also is no answer to posit timeless, invariant
distinctions between institutional forms and competencies—based, for
example, on the difference between individual and collective claims,
or between retrospective and prospective relief.  As the rise of MDL
proceedings illustrates, reality has a way of complicating such neat ac-
ademic dichotomies.  The fact that courts have become increasingly
hostile to experimentation with the class action device does not mean
that the judicial system has become hostile to innovation with new
methods for processing and resolving mass claims.  Disputes about in-
formation-economy problems are calling forth new litigation hybrids
133. See id. at 402–13.
134. Cf. Mari J. Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2195, 2209–11 (2000) (arguing
that facially neutral rules allocating responsibility can conceal important background questions
about both accountability and distributive justice).
135. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1472 (2013).
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(and new administrative hybrids as well).136  One possible future for
the courts, to borrow from Seth Kreimer, is that the judicial system
simply will become increasingly irrelevant in the era of networked,
systemic, information-based harms.137  But the facts on the ground al-
ready hint at a more complex set of possibilities.
Courts now refusing to engage directly with information privacy
claims are not just passing the buck to other legal institutions; they
also are working actively to define another possible future—one in
which different kinds of claims and claimants are accorded different
kinds of process and in which mass actions are systematically deprived
of their potential force as a lever for broader sociotechnical change.
They would do better to reckon more directly and deliberately with
what is at stake.  In an era of systemic, networked harms that inevita-
bly generate mass claims, the judicial system can remain a force for
transformative legal change only if it also is willing to embrace trans-
formation for itself.
V. CONCLUSION
Questions about standing, waiver, joinder, and so on are more than
just questions about purity of institutional form.  They are questions
about the precise location of the fault line between the rule of law and
the rule of economic power.  The information privacy lawsuits now
inundating the courts are part of a larger process of institutional
change, both the scope and direction of which are contested.  The out-
comes of information privacy lawsuits will help to determine the ex-
tent of powerful new industries’ ability to act in the market with
relative impunity for harms to individual consumers and to the public.
They also will help to shape the institutional forms of law in the infor-
mation era.
136. On MDL and litigation hybrids, see supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also Peter R
H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941,
956–63 (1995).  On administrative hybrids, see Richard A. Nagareda, Future Mass Tort Claims
and the Rule-Making/Adjudication Distinction, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1781, 1788–92 (2000). See gener-
ally Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 120 (urging the development of hybrid administra- R
tive proceedings for supervising the disposition of mass tort claims); Michael D. Sant’Imbrogio
& Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2012); Adam S.
Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011); ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, AGGREGATION OF SIMILAR CLAIMS IN AGENCY ADJUDICATION 3–6
(June 10, 2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aggregate-agency-adjudica-
tion-final-recommendation_1.pdf.
137. Kreimer, supra note 7, at 795–96. R
